this post was submitted on 08 Apr 2024
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TL;DR: starting with 5.6.1-2, XZ is safe on Arch. Safe as in not affected by this particular vulnerability.
Look here: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/xz/-/commit/881385757abdc39d3cfea1c3e34ec09f637424ad
And here: https://security.archlinux.org/ASA-202403-1
5.6.1-2 is where the package switched from building from the tarball (backdoored) to the upstream git repo (clean). The tarball release contained some extra build instructions (which didn't exist in the git repo) that added the backdoor during the build process. The issue arose from the downstream maintainers' assumption that the contents of the tarball and the git repo were identical.
Subsequent changes, and 5.6.1-3, were mostly administrative, like changing the git repository's URL (since the maintainer's github account was banned) and locking out Jia Tan's PGP key.
That article is bullshit, don't believe a thing it says. Arch was not affected by the SSH vulnerability because the
sshd
binary did not linkliblzma
where the backdoor existed, so they could never communicate in a way that could be exploited by this particular vulnerability. It was not part of the fix.This is what I was looking for. Though if 5.6.1-2 doesn't contain the backdoor, why is it listed as the last version that does contain it everywhere?
I don't know, but the official advisory is most likely to be correct. Everything else is a game of Chinese whispers where the information becomes less reliable the more it is passed on. Maybe it's because -2 still had Jia Tan's signing key, and could have, theoretically, accepted commits signed by them.
Where is it listed as such? Can you give examples?
Hmm I looked it up and I'm either searching it wrong or it seems like the articles were edited and the stuff about 5.6.1-2 being infected is deleted. I think you're right about the keys. That could be the reason for yellow press to exaggerate the problem