maltfield

joined 1 year ago
[–] maltfield@monero.town -1 points 11 months ago* (last edited 11 months ago)

Yes, it's clearly disclosed in my profile that I am the founder of the BusKill project.

This is a PSA that our sale has started. I've had inquiries from members of our community asking about Black Friday sales.

10% off is barely any discount anyway.

Sorry, we're a very small open-source shop. I’ve paid myself nothing so-far. The price just barely breaks-even for the business.

All of this is explained in-detail in “The Finances” section here.

Prices would drop dramatically if we could do production runs (and actually sell) >10,000 units at a time. Currently we only sell a few cables per month. If you want to help, please tell all your security-conscious friends about BusKill :)

[–] maltfield@monero.town -5 points 11 months ago

Hi, this is not spam but a useful PSA that's full of information, not just about the sale.

BusKill is useful for many groups, including human rights defenders, activists, journalists, whistleblowers, etc. You can read more about the use-cases of our community at our documentation here:

[–] maltfield@monero.town 1 points 1 year ago

Yes, BusKill works with any USB drive.

In fact, the BusKill cable is just a USB Drive. The only thing "fancy" that it has is a magnetic coupler in the middle of the 1-meter cable so that it will breakaway at any angle. But, if you'd like, you can build your own. The instructions are here:

 

This article describes how to setup keyboard shortcuts in QubesOS so that you can temporarily disarm (pause) the BusKill laptop kill cord.

This allows the user to, for example, go to the bathroom without causing their computer to shutdown or self-destruct.

Arm & Disarm BusKill in QubesOS

This is a guide that builds on part one: A Laptop Kill Cord for QubesOS (1/2). Before reading this, you should already be familiar with how to setup udev rules for BusKill on QubesOS.

  1. A Laptop Kill Cord for QubesOS (1/2)
  2. Disarm BusKill in QubesOS (2/2)

ⓘ Note: This post is adapted from its original article on Tom Hocker's blog.

What is BusKill?

What if someone literally steals your laptop while you're working with classified information inside a Whonix DispVM? They'd also be able to recover data from previous DispVMs--as Disposable VM's rootfs virtual files are not securely shredded after your DispVM is destroyed.

Are you a security researcher, journalist, or intelligence operative that works in QubesOS--exploiting Qubes' brilliant security-through-compartimentalization to keep your data safe? Do you make use of Whonix Disposable VMs for your work? Great! This post is for you.

I'm sure your QubesOS laptop has Full Disk Encryption and you're using a strong passphrase. But what if someone literally steals your laptop while you're working with classified information inside a Whonix DispVM? Not only will they get access to all of your AppVM's private data and the currently-running Whonix DispVM's data, but there's a high chance they'd be able to recover data from previous DispVMs--as Disposable VM's rootfs virtual files (volatile.img) are not securely shredded after your DispVM is destroyed by Qubes!

Let's say you're a journalist, activist, whistleblower, or a human rights worker in an oppressive regime. Or an intelligence operative behind enemy lines doing research or preparing a top-secret document behind a locked door. What do you do to protect your data, sources, or assets when the secret police suddenly batter down your door? How quickly can you actually act to shutdown your laptop and shred your RAM and/or FDE encryption keys?

BusKill Demo
Watch the BusKill Explainer Video for more info youtube.com/v/qPwyoD_cQR4

BusKill utilizes a magnetic trip-wire that tethers your body to your laptop. If you suddenly jump to your feet or fall off your chair (in response to the battering ram crashing through your door) or your laptop is ripped off your table by a group of armed thugs, the data bus' magnetic connection will be severed. This event causes a configurable trigger to execute.

The BusKill trigger can be anything from:

  1. locking your screen or
  2. shutting down the computer or
  3. initiating a self-destruct sequence

While our last post described how to setup such a system in QubesOS with BusKill, this post will describe how to add keyboard shortcuts to arm & disarm the dead man switch (eg so you can go to the bathroom).

Disclaimer

This guide contains experimental files, commands, and software. The information contained in this article may or may not lead to corruption or total permanent deletion of some or all of your data. We've done our best to carefully guide the user so they know the risks of each BusKill trigger, but we cannot be responsible for any data loss that has occurred as a result of following this guide.

The contents of this guide is provided openly and is licensed under the CC-BY-SA license. The software included in this guide is licensed under the GNU GPLv3 license. All content here is consistent with the limitations of liabilities outlined in its respective licenses.

We highly recommend that any experiments with the scripts included in this article are used exclusively on a disposable machine containing no valuable data.

If data loss is a concern for you, then leave now and do not proceed with following this guide. You have been warned.

Release Note

Also be aware that, due to the risks outlined above, BusKill will not be released with this "self-destruct" trigger.

If you purchase a BusKill cable, it will only ship with non-destructive triggers that lock the screen or shutdown the computer. Advanced users can follow guides to add additional destructive triggers, such as the one described in this post, but they should do so at their own risk--taking carefully into consideration all of the warnings outlined above and throughout this article.

Again, if you buy a BusKill cable, the worst that can happen is your computer will abruptly shutdown.

Assumptions

This guide necessarily makes several assumptions outlined below.

sys-usb

In this guide, we assume that your QubesOS install has a USB-Qube named 'sys-usb' for handling USB events on behalf of dom0.

If you decided to combine your USB and networking Qubes at install time, then replace all references in this guide for 'sys-usb' to 'sys-net'.

If you decided to run your 'sys-usb' VM as a DispoableVM at install time, then replace all references in this guide for 'sys-usb' its Disposable TemplateVM (eg 'fedora-36-dvm').

..And if you chose not to isolate your USB devices, then may god help you.

Udev Device Matching

BusKill in Linux uses udev to detect when the USB's cable is severed. The exact udev rule that you use in the files below will depend on the drive you choose to use in your BusKill cable.

In this guide, we identify our BusKill-specific drive with the 'ENV{ID_MODEL}=="Micromax_A74"' udev property. You should replace this property with one that matches your BusKill-specific drive.

To determine how to query your USB drive for device-specific identifiers, see Introducing BusKill: A Kill Cord for your Laptop. Note that the `udevadm monitor --environment --udev` command should be run in the 'sys-usb' Qube.

ⓘ Note: If you'd prefer to buy a BusKill cable than make your own, you can buy one fully assembled here.

QubesOS Version

This guide was written for QubesOS v4.1.

[user@dom0 ~]$ cat /etc/redhat-release Qubes release 4.1.2 (R4.1)
[user@dom0 ~]$

BusKill Files

This section will describe what files should be created and where.

Due to the design of QubesOS, it takes a bit of mental gymnastics to understand what we're doing and why. It's important to keep in mind that, in QubesOS

  1. The keyboard and UI are configured in 'dom0'
  2. USB devices (like the BusKill device) are routed to the 'sys-usb' VM
  3. dom0 has the privilege to execute scripts inside other VMs (eg 'sys-usb')
  4. By design, VMs should *not* be able to send arbitrary commands to be executed in dom0
  5. ...but via the qubes-rpc, we can permit some VMs (eg 'sys-usb') to execute a script in dom0 (though for security reasons, ideally such that no data/input is sent from the less-trusted VM to dom0 -- other than the name of the script)

Due to the constraints listed above:

  1. We'll be configuring the disarm button as keyboard shortcut in dom0
  2. We'll be saving and executing the 'buskill-disarm.sh' script in 'sys-usb' (because these scripts manipulate our udev rules)
  3. The keyboard shortcut in dom0 will actually be executing the above script in 'sys-usb'

sys-usb

If you followed our previous guide to setting-up BusKill in QubesOS, then you should already have a file in 'sys-usb' at '/rw/config/buskill.rules'. You may even have modified it to trigger a LUKS Self-Destruct on removal of your BusKill device.

Because you're now experimenting with a new setup, let's go ahead and wipe out that old file with a new one that just executes a soft-shutdown. You might need some days to get used to the new disarm procedure, and you probably don't want to suddenly loose all your data due to an accidental false-positive!

Execute the following on your 'sys-usb' Qube:

mv /rw/config/buskill.rules /rw/config/buskill.rules.bak.`date "+%Y%m%d_%H%M%S"`
cat << EOF | sudo tee /rw/config/buskill.rules
################################################################################
# File:    sys-usb:/etc/udev/rules.d/buskill.rules -> /rw/config/buskill.rules
# Purpose: Add buskill rules. For more info, see: https://buskill.in/qubes-os/
# Authors: Michael Altfield 
# Created: 2020-01-02
# License: GNU GPLv3
################################################################################
ACTION=="remove", SUBSYSTEM=="usb", ENV{ID_MODEL}=="Micromax_A74", RUN+="/usr/bin/qrexec-client-vm dom0 buskill.softShutdown"
EOF
sudo ln -s /rw/config/buskill.rules /etc/udev/rules.d/
sudo udevadm control --reload

Now, let's add a new udev '.rules' file. This one will always just lock your screen, and it's what will be put in-place when BusKill is "disarmed".

Execute the following on your 'sys-usb' Qube:

cat << EOF | sudo tee /rw/config/buskill.lock.rules
################################################################################
# File:    sys-usb:/etc/udev/rules.d/buskill.rules -> /rw/config/buskill.lock.rules
# Purpose: Just lock the screen. For more info, see: https://buskill.in/qubes-os/
# Authors: Michael Altfield 
# Created: 2023-05-10
# License: GNU GPLv3
################################################################################
ACTION=="remove", SUBSYSTEM=="usb", ENV{ID_MODEL}=="Micromax_A74", RUN+="/usr/bin/qrexec-client-vm dom0 buskill.lock"
EOF

The careful reader will see that we're not actually disarming BusKill in the same sense as our BusKill GUI app. Indeed, what we're actually going to do is swap these two files for 30 seconds.

This way, if BusKill is armed and you remove the cable, your computer shuts-down.

But if you want to disarm, the procedure becomes:

  1. Hit the "Disarm BusKill" keyboard shortcut (see below)
  2. Wait for the toast popup message indicating that BusKill is now disarmed
  3. Remove the cable within 30 seconds
  4. Your screen locks (instead of shutting down)

Personally, I can't think of a QubesOS user that would want to leave their machine unlocked when they go to the bathroom, so I figured this approach would work better than an actual disarm.

Bonus: when you return from your break, just plug-in the BusKill cable in, and it'll already be armed (reducing the risk of user error due to forgetting to arm BusKill).

Now, let's add the actual 'buskill-disarm.sh' script to disarm BusKill:

Execute the following on your 'sys-usb' Qube:

cat << EOF | sudo tee /usr/local/bin/buskill-disarm.sh
#!/bin/bash
 
################################################################################
# File:    sys-usb:/usr/local/bin/buskill-disarm.sh
# Purpose: Temp disarm BusKill. For more info, see: https://buskill.in/qubes-os/
# Authors: Tom 
# Co-Auth: Michael Altfield 
# Created: 2023-05-10
# License: GNU GPLv3
################################################################################
 
# replace the 'shutdown' trigger with the 'lock' trigger
sudo rm /etc/udev/rules.d/buskill.rules
sudo ln -s /rw/config/buskill.lock.rules /etc/udev/rules.d/buskill.rules
sudo udevadm control --reload
 
# let the user know that BusKill is now temporarily disarmed
notify-send -t 21000 "BusKill" "Disarmed for 30 seconds" -i changes-allow
 
# wait 30 seconds
sleep 30
 
# replace the 'lock' trigger with the 'shutdown' trigger
sudo rm /etc/udev/rules.d/buskill.rules
sudo ln -s /rw/config/buskill.rules /etc/udev/rules.d/buskill.rules
sudo udevadm control --reload
notify-send -t 5000 "BusKill" "BusKill is Armed" -i changes-prevent
EOF
sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/buskill-disarm.sh

dom0

If you followed our previous guide to setting-up BusKill in QubesOS, then you shouldn't need to add any files to dom0. What you do need to do is setup some keyboard shortcuts.

In the QubesOS GUI, click on the big Q "Start Menu" in the top-left of your XFCE panel to open the Applications menu. Navigate to 'System Tools' and click Keyboard

Screenshot of QubesOS with an arrow pointing to the "Q" Application Menu in the very top-left of the screen Screenshot of QubesOS Application Menu with "System Tools -> Keyboard" highlighted
Click the “Q” to open the QubesOS Application Menu Click System Tools -> Keyboard

Click the 'Application Shortcuts' Tab and then click the '+ Add' button on the bottom-left of the window.

Screenshot of QubesOS Keyboard Settings Window that shows the "Application Shortcuts" tab highlighted'alt Screenshot of QubesOS Keyboard Settings Window that shows the "+ Add" button highlightedalt
Click the “Application Shortcuts” tab to add a Keyboard Shortcut in Qubes Click the “Add” Button to add a new Keyboard Shortcut in Qubes

In the 'Command' input field, type the following

qvm-run sys-usb buskill-disarm.sh

The above command will execute a command in 'dom0' that will execute a command in 'sys-usb' that will execute the 'buskill-disarm.sh' script that we created above.

Screenshot of QubesOS Keyboard Settings Window that shows the \"OK\" button highlighted
After typing the command to be executed when the keyboard shortcut is pressed, click the "OK" button

Now click "OK" and, when prompted, type Ctrl+Shift+D (or whatever keyboard shortcut you want to bind to "Disarming BusKill").

Screenshot of QubesOS Keyboard Settings Window that shows the prompt "Press now the keyboard keys you want to use to trigger the command..."alt Screenshot of QubesOS Keyboard Settings Window that shows the selected Shortcut "Shift+Ctrl+D"
Type "Ctrl+Shift+D" or whatever keyboard shortcut you want to trigger BusKill to be disarmed for 30 seconds                                            

You should now have a keyboard shortcut binding for disarming BusKill!

Screenshot of QubesOSKeyboard Settings Window that shows the newly created keyboard shortcutfor \"Shift+Ctrl+D\" at the top of thelist

Test It!

At this point, you can test your new (temporary) BusKill Disarm functionality by:

  1. Plugging-in your BusKill cable
  2. Typing Ctrl+Shift+D
  3. Waiting for the toast popup message to appear indicating that BusKill is disarmed for 30 seconds
  4. Unplugging your BusKill cable

Your machine should lock, not shutdown.

Screenshot of QubesOS with a toast message in the top-right that says \"BusKill Disarmed for 30 Seconds\"
After hitting the keyboard shortcut to disarm BusKill, you have 30 seconds to remove the cable

After 30 seconds, return to your computer and test the normal "arm" functionality:

  1. Plug-in your BusKill cable
  2. Unlock your screen
  3. Unplug your BusKill cable

Your computer should shutdown, not lock.

Screenshot of QubesOS with a toast message in the top-right that says \"BusKill is Armed\"
30 seconds after hitting the keyboard shortcut, BusKill will arm itself

Troubleshooting

Is unplugging your USB device doing nothing? Having other issues?

See the Troubleshooting section in our original guide to using BusKill on QubesOS.

Limitations/Improvements

Security is porous. All software has bugs. Nothing is 100% secure. For more limitations to using BusKill on QubesOS, see the Limitations section in our original guide to using BusKill on QubesOS.

Buy a BusKill Cable

We look forward to continuing to improve the BusKill software and making BusKill more accessible this year. If you want to help, please consider purchasing a BusKill cable for yourself or a loved one. It helps us fund further development, and you get your own BusKill cable to keep you or your loved ones safe.

You can also buy a BusKill cable with bitcoin, monero, and other altcoins from our BusKill Store's .onion site.

Stay safe,
The BusKill Team
https://www.buskill.in/
http://www.buskillvampfih2iucxhit3qp36i2zzql3u6pmkeafvlxs3tlmot5yad.onion

[–] maltfield@monero.town -1 points 1 year ago

It's run by the folks at dys2p.

Besides running ProxyStore in Leipzig, they have published some pretty great articles:

You can follow them on Mastodon here https://chaos.social/@dys2p

[–] maltfield@monero.town 5 points 1 year ago

Yes BusKill works similarly -- any USB drive can use the BusKill software

The BusKill cable is just nice because it includes a magnetic breakaway, so it works when the laptop is snatched-away at any angle. There's actually a ton of anti-forensics software like usbkill and BusKill; we enumerate them all on our documentation's Similar Projects section

You may want to check ^ it out :)

[–] maltfield@monero.town 3 points 1 year ago

Thank you for supporting open-source security hardware <3

[–] maltfield@monero.town 9 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

I made a video of this (demo in Windows, MacOS, Linux, TAILS, and QubesOS) with the old DIY model here (sorry for the terrible audio quality)

We're currently working on an updated video with someone who is much better at video production than me; it should be finished in early 2024.

 

My GitHub repo awesome-lemmy-instances (that provides a detailed table to quickly compare lemmy instances) now includes the number of months that the instance has been tracked in the MO field.

We're now limiting the "recommended instances" to just instances with MO >= 2 months.

Data is pulled from the Fediverse Observer API.

[–] maltfield@monero.town 2 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

You'd need magnets, pogo pins, wire, glue, solder, etc. The list of materials needed is listed in the "Materials" section of this article.

@Goldfishlaser@lemmy.ml can provide more info

[–] maltfield@monero.town 0 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

It has a magnetic (de)coupler, which allows it to break away at any angle if your laptop is physically snatched away from you.

Some of our users actually use the BusKill cable with a Yubikey:

If that's not clear, I highly recommend watching this 2-minute explainer video

[–] maltfield@monero.town 4 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

I build open-source USB Dead Man Switches and the accompanying (also free) software

What is BusKill? (Explainer Video)
Watch the BusKill Explainer Video for more info youtube.com/v/qPwyoD_cQR4

You attach the kill cable to your body and if the connection between you to your computer is severed, then your device will lock, shutdown, or shred its encryption keys. It's designed to protect high-risk users’ data. Data could include private keys (eg theft of cryptocurrency assets), contacts of correspondence (eg sources of a journalist – such as whistleblowers), etc.

 

We're happy to announce the release of BusKill v0.7.0!

BusKill Release Announcement v0.7.0

Most importantly, this release allows you to arm the BusKill GUI app such that it shuts-down your computer when the BusKill cable's connection to the computer is severed.

What is BusKill?

BusKill is a laptop kill-cord. It's a USB cable with a magnetic breakaway that you attach to your body and connect to your computer.

What is BusKill? (Explainer Video)
Watch the BusKill Explainer Video for more info youtube.com/v/qPwyoD_cQR4

If the connection between you to your computer is severed, then your device will lock, shutdown, or shred its encryption keys -- thus keeping your encrypted data safe from thieves that steal your device.

Upgrading

You can upgrade your BusKill app to the latest version either by

  1. Clicking "Update" in the app or
  2. Downloading it from GitHub

Changes

This update includes many bug fixes and new features, including:

  1. Adds support for 'soft-shutdown' trigger to GUI
  2. Adds a new buskill.ini config file
  3. Adds a new "Settings" screen in GUI
  4. Merges kivy & buskill config files into one standardized location
  5. Fixes in-app updates on MacOS
  6. Fixes lockscreen trigger on Linux Mint Cinnamon
  7. Fixes background blue/red disarm/arm color to propagate to all screens
  8. Fixes --run-trigger to be executed inside usb_handler child process and communicate to root_child through the parent process

You can find our changelog here:

Documentation Improvements

We've also made many improvements to our documentation

  1. Updated the Software User Guide to include how to arm the BusKill app with the soft-shutdown trigger in the GUI
  2. Added a manpage
  3. Better documentation on how to build your own USB-C BusKill Cable
  4. Better documentation on how to test the buskill app
  5. Fixes in Release Workflow
  6. Added some additional related projects to our documentation

Soft-Shutdown Trigger

This release now allows you to choose between either [a] locking your screen or [b] shutting down your computer when you arm the BusKill app from the GUI. By default, the BusKill app will trigger the lockscreen. To choose the 'soft-shutdown' trigger, open the navigation drawer, go to the Settings Screen, click Trigger, and change the selected trigger from lock-screen to soft-shutdown. For more information, see our Software GUI User Guide.

BusKill Now in Debian!

We're also happy to announce that, with the release of Debian 12, it's now possible to install BusKill in Debian with Apt!

sudo apt-get install buskill

Testers Needed!

We do our best to test the BusKill app on Linux, Windows, and MacOS. But unfortunately it's possible that our app doesn't fully function on all versions, distributions, and flavours of these three platforms.

We could really use your help testing the BusKill app, especially if you have access to a system that's not (yet) listed in our Supported Platforms.

And in this release, we specifically would like you to help us test the new soft shutdown feature. Please let us know if it does or does not work for you.

Please contact us if you'd like to help test the BusKill app :)

 

We're happy to announce the release of BusKill v0.7.0!

BusKill Release Announcement v0.7.0

Most importantly, this release allows you to arm the BusKill GUI app such that it shuts-down your computer when the BusKill cable's connection to the computer is severed.

What is BusKill?

BusKill is a laptop kill-cord. It's a USB cable with a magnetic breakaway that you attach to your body and connect to your computer.

What is BusKill? (Explainer Video)
Watch the BusKill Explainer Video for more info youtube.com/v/qPwyoD_cQR4

If the connection between you to your computer is severed, then your device will lock, shutdown, or shred its encryption keys -- thus keeping your encrypted data safe from thieves that steal your device.

Upgrading

You can upgrade your BusKill app to the latest version either by

  1. Clicking "Update" in the app or
  2. Downloading it from GitHub

Changes

This update includes many bug fixes and new features, including:

  1. Adds support for 'soft-shutdown' trigger to GUI
  2. Adds a new buskill.ini config file
  3. Adds a new "Settings" screen in GUI
  4. Merges kivy & buskill config files into one standardized location
  5. Fixes in-app updates on MacOS
  6. Fixes lockscreen trigger on Linux Mint Cinnamon
  7. Fixes background blue/red disarm/arm color to propagate to all screens
  8. Fixes --run-trigger to be executed inside usb_handler child process and communicate to root_child through the parent process

You can find our changelog here:

Documentation Improvements

We've also made many improvements to our documentation

  1. Updated the Software User Guide to include how to arm the BusKill app with the soft-shutdown trigger in the GUI
  2. Added a manpage
  3. Better documentation on how to build your own USB-C BusKill Cable
  4. Better documentation on how to test the buskill app
  5. Fixes in Release Workflow
  6. Added some additional related projects to our documentation

Soft-Shutdown Trigger

This release now allows you to choose between either [a] locking your screen or [b] shutting down your computer when you arm the BusKill app from the GUI. By default, the BusKill app will trigger the lockscreen. To choose the 'soft-shutdown' trigger, open the navigation drawer, go to the Settings Screen, click Trigger, and change the selected trigger from lock-screen to soft-shutdown. For more information, see our Software GUI User Guide.

BusKill Now in Debian!

We're also happy to announce that, with the release of Debian 12, it's now possible to install BusKill in Debian with Apt!

sudo apt-get install buskill

Testers Needed!

We do our best to test the BusKill app on Linux, Windows, and MacOS. But unfortunately it's possible that our app doesn't fully function on all versions, distributions, and flavours of these three platforms.

We could really use your help testing the BusKill app, especially if you have access to a system that's not (yet) listed in our Supported Platforms.

And in this release, we specifically would like you to help us test the new soft shutdown feature. Please let us know if it does or does not work for you.

Please contact us if you'd like to help test the BusKill app :)

 

From the moment I began my freelance web design business back in 2014, I was collecting payments via Stripe and happily paying their processing fees for the ability to grow my business from just a desire for more freedom to running a company that employs women and supports them to create their own freedom and financial independence.

It never occurred to me that using Stripe to process payments would become one of the biggest risks to my small business.

My Stripe account was hacked due to Stripe’s lax security, over $70,000 of fraudulent charges were processed by the hacker through a fake connected account, paid out instantly to that person via Stripe’s Instant Payments to the hacker’s pre-paid debit card, and Stripe started pulling the money out of my business bank account to pay back the victims of the theft.

And Stripe says it’s my fault that my account was hacked and that I’m liable to pay back the victims of the fraud.

Listen to the full podcast episode or read on to find out exactly what happened and how to protect your business.


On a quiet Monday morning after the Easter holiday, I was sipping coffee on my couch in Columbus, Ohio like I normally do, snuggling with my dog and going through my normal morning entrepreneurial routine of checking emails and DMs on my business account when I see an email from Stripe with the subject line:

“Subject: [Action required] Closure of your Stripe account”

We recently identified payments on your Stripe account that don’t appear to have been authorized by the customer, meaning that the owner of the card or bank account didn’t consent to these payments.

As a precautionary measure, we will no longer accept payments for [your company].

We will also begin issuing refunds on card payments on April 15, 2023, although they may take longer to appear on the cardholder’s statement.

Please refer to your dashboard for a list of the charges that will be refunded. If there are insufficient funds on your account to cover any refunds, those refunds won’t be processed and any outstanding funds will remain in your account .

If you believe that we’ve misunderstood or miscategorized your business and would like us to conduct another review of your account , please complete the form on your Stripe Dashboard to provide more information about your business.

Request further review

If you have any questions, you can contact us any time from our support site.”

I remember thinking… yeah, this is probably some phishing scam…

So I check out the “From” address, and actually click into it to see the actual address and it’s saying it’s FROM accounts@stripe.com

And I log into my Stripe account from a separate browser, you know, just in case… and after using my Authenticator app because I have 2-factor authentication set up on my account, I see the request at the top of my account asking me to provide proof that I am the owner of my business.

I look at my recent authorized transactions and nothing is out of the ordinary… all of the successful payment listed are from students inside my Web Designer Academy who have been making their monthly membership payments like clockwork.

And I think, “This must just be a mistake. I’ve been a customer of Stripe for 8 years now. I’ll submit all the documentation Stripe requested and I’m sure that will take care of it.”

So I grab my laptop, submit all the documentation right away, and get back to snuggling and scrolling.

Then I log into my back account and see a withdrawal from my business checking account from Stripe for over $600. And another pending transaction for a withdrawal over $2000. And no credits for the payments that were made by students over the weekend.

And I’m feeling very confused thinking, “What is happening?”

I’m starting to feel the anxiety bubbling up, but I tell myself to be patient. Once they review all the documents I submitted to prove that I am who I say I am, this will all get resolved.

A few hours later, I receive another email:

“Subject: Additional review completed for Stripe Shop”

Whew, I think. I’m glad they took care of this so quickly.

I click into the email, and my heart starting pounding in my chest as I read it:

“Thank you for providing additional information about your business.

After reviewing your account again, we’ve confirmed that your business represents a higher risk than we can currently support.

We are unable to accept payments for [your company] moving forward.

Payouts to your bank account have been paused, and we will issue refunds on any card payments by May 10, 2023, although they may take longer to appear on the cardholder’s statement.

If there are insufficient funds on your account to cover any refunds, these refunds will not be processed and any outstanding funds will remain on your account.

Please refer to your Dashboard for a list of the charges to be refunded.

If you’d like to further appeal our decision, please contact us.”

I can feel the panic rising in my body. I tap on the Stripe app on my phone and I see that there’s a negative payout balance… but all the transactions listed in the app are legit.

I logged back into my Stripe account via my computer trying to figure out what in the world they are talking about, what are all these charges that they are saying are fraudulent? I’m looking for a phone number I can call to talk to someone.

I start clicking through every link in my Stripe dashboard, and when I get to the “Connect” menu item, that’s when I see it.

Two accounts with the business name of “Netflix.com” under the name “Albert Dawkins” which between the two accounts had racked up over $70,000 in credit card charges in the 3 days over the Easter holiday weekend.

Looking more closely, the ill-gotten gains were paid out instantly to a pre-paid debit card via Stripe’s Instant Payouts feature the moment the transactions were successful.

I realized my Stripe account was hacked. ...

 

The GitHub repo that provides a comparison table of different lemmy instances now includes the version of lemmy that's installed

Thanks to Sunny (TheLastZombie) for the PR :)

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