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What happens when Signal server gets compromised ? (lemmy.ml)

submitted 3 years ago* (last edited 3 years ago) by javik@lemmy.ml to c/privacy@lemmy.ml

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Hello Everyone,

This is something I've been thinking about in the wake of many users joining Signal, due to WhatsApp's new privacy policy changes.

When it comes to the mobile client (in case of Android), we could verify its integrity by checking the source code & the APK's integrity using reproducible builds (https://signal.org/blog/reproducible-android/).

When it comes to the server, it is possible that it could get compromised in many ways.

My question is, when it comes to privacy & security, does the server integrity matter if we are reasonably sure the client isn't compromised in any way or doesn't transmit anything that the server could access in a meaningful way.

And, this could apply to any service that has both FOSS client & server or just FOSS client.

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[+] poVoq@lemmy.ml 0 points 3 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) (1 children)

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[–] javik@lemmy.ml 0 points 3 years ago (1 children)

But, we could install a version of signal client that's not compromised, which sends as little as possible, encrypted. So, a compromised server could deny the requests, because the client was modified or it couldn't work with the encrypted content the way it expected. This would automatically raise red flags, because the app doesn't work anymore. Has something like this happened?

And for the deploying modified versions to targeted devices. I know it's possible through orders or compromised server, but has it happened? If so, any sources regarding that.

[–] dessalines@lemmy.ml 0 points 3 years ago (1 children)

That really doesn't matter, because a compromised server could get hoard a lot of info even assuming the message content is secure. I forget what video it was, but it was emphasizing linkability, what the western security orgs care about more than content, is linking your accounts to create a digital footprint.

Signal has everyone's phone number (its mandatory), and connections between accounts (timestamped messages with sender and recipient info). You can pretty much link a phone number to your identity, your name and address, credit cards, so a compromised signal server is a centralized place with everyone's social connections, message activity, names, and addresses.

[–] javik@lemmy.ml 0 points 3 years ago* (last edited 3 years ago) (1 children)

But, signal has the concept of sealed sender (https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/), where signal doesn't know who is sending the messages.

This is when the government asked for data from Signal, "The only Signal user data we have, and the only data the US government obtained as a result, was the date of account creation and the date of last use – not user messages, groups, contacts, profile information, or anything else." (https://signal.org/blog/looking-back-as-the-world-moves-forward/)

With my phone number, they could tie it to other services, but not with the contacts in Signal itself.

This is something related to how groups are secured - https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/

[–] federico3@lemmy.ml 1 points 3 years ago

Sealed sender does nothing against timing correlation. It's really trivial correlate traffic over TCP connections and find out which pairs of IP addresses are communicating with each other.

Unsurprisingly, it's ineffective against users that exchange messages very rarely and effective with users texting every day.

Signal does nothing to mitigate this problem.