this post was submitted on 04 Nov 2024
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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/24645301

They emailed me a PDF. It opened fine with evince and looked like a simple doc at first. Then I clicked on a field in the form. Strangely, instead of simply populating the field with my text, a PDF note window popped up so my text entry went into a PDF note, which many viewers present as a sticky note icon.

If I were to fax this PDF, the PDF comments would just get lost. So to fill out the form I fed it to LaTeX and used the overpic pkg to write text wherever I choose. LaTeX rejected the file.. could not handle this PDF. Then I used the file command to see what I am dealing with:

$ file signature_page.pdf
signature_page.pdf: Java serialization data, version 5

WTF is that? I know PDF supports JavaScript (shitty indeed). Is that what this is? “Java” is not JavaScript, so I’m baffled. Why is java in a PDF? (edit: explainer on java serialization, and some analysis)

My workaround was to use evince to print the PDF to PDF (using a PDF-building printer driver or whatever evince uses), then feed that into LaTeX. That worked.

My question is, how common is this? Is it going to become a mechanism to embed a tracking pixel like corporate assholes do with HTML email?

I probably need to change my habits. I know PDF docs can serve as carriers of copious malware anyway. Some people go to the extreme of creating a one-time use virtual machine with PDF viewer which then prints a PDF to a PDF before destroying the VM which is assumed to be compromised.

My temptation is to take a less tedious approach. E.g. something like:

$ firejail --net=none evince untrusted.pdf

I should be able to improve on that by doing something non-interactive. My first guess:

$ firejail --net=none gs -sDEVICE=pdfwrite -q -dFIXEDMEDIA -dSCALE=1 -o is_this_output_safe.pdf -- /usr/share/ghostscript/*/lib/viewpbm.ps untrusted_input.pdf

output:

Error: /invalidfileaccess in --file--
Operand stack:
   (untrusted_input.pdf)   (r)
Execution stack:
   %interp_exit   .runexec2   --nostringval--   --nostringval--   --nostringval--   2   %stopped_push   --nostringval--   --nostringval--   --nostringval--   false   1   %stopped_push   1990   1   3   %oparray_pop   1989   1   3   %oparray_pop   1977   1   3   %oparray_pop   1833   1   3   %oparray_pop   --nostringval--   %errorexec_pop   .runexec2   --nostringval--   --nostringval--   --nostringval--   2   %stopped_push   --nostringval--   --nostringval--   --nostringval--   %array_continue   --nostringval--
Dictionary stack:
   --dict:769/1123(ro)(G)--   --dict:0/20(G)--   --dict:87/200(L)--   --dict:0/20(L)--
Current allocation mode is local
Last OS error: Permission denied
Current file position is 10479
GPL Ghostscript 10.00.0: Unrecoverable error, exit code 1

What’s my problem? Better ideas? I would love it if attempts to reach the cloud could be trapped and recorded to a log file in the course of neutering the PDF.

(note: I also wonder what happens when Firefox opens this PDF considering Mozilla is happy to blindly execute whatever code it receives no matter the context.)

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[–] BearOfaTime@lemm.ee 3 points 4 days ago* (last edited 4 days ago)

The personally identifiable information has largely been anonymized in these models

This tells me all we need to know about you.

You're an apologist for these companies. It's been repeatedly demonstrated such anonymization can be pretty easily reversed.