privacy

Bis zum Jahr 2030 will die EU allen Bürger:innen eine „European Digital Identity Wallet“ (ID-Wallet) zur Verfügung stellen. Sie soll on- wie offline bei Verwaltungsgängen und Bankgeschäften, aber auch bei Arztbesuchen, Alterskontrollen oder beim Internetshopping zum Einsatz kommen.

(By 2030, the EU wants to provide all citizens with a “European Digital Identity Wallet” (ID wallet). It is intended to be used online and offline for administrative procedures and banking as well as medical visits, age verification, and internet shopping.)

The article (in German) is mostly about eIDAS 45; there are many English articles about it; see e.g.
https://mullvad.net/en/blog/eu-digital-identity-framework-eidas-another-kind-of-chat-control

Though not the main topic of the article, this “ID wallet” thing sounds disturbing. (EU politicians calls a normal wallet “unhosted wallet” and don’t like it very much.)

Many countries use censorship systems to block access to human rights resources

.onion sites are particularly useful at maximizing internet users' privacy and anonymity because they never leave the Tor network.

While technically I2P might be better, it’s good news that a recognized human rights organization has adopted an onion, because that will improve the “shady” image of Tor, esp. hidden services (aka darknet), as in “privacy technology is good, not for criminals, but for you, for everyone. Using Tor is normal, and Monero is a great tool.”

Retroshare establish encrypted connections between you and your friends to create a network of computers, and provides various distributed services on top of it: forums, channels, chat, mail... Retroshare is fully decentralized, and designed to provide maximum security and anonymity to its users beyond direct friends. Retroshare is entirely free and open-source software. It is available on Android, Linux, MacOS and Windows. There are no hidden costs, no ads and no terms of service.

law enforcement has been using […] systems since 2015, in utmost secrecy. The software in question […] can track a person across a network of cameras, for instance, by the color of their sweater

Any policeman […] can request to use [it]

The potential use of facial recognition worries within the institution itself. […] In France, facial recognition is only authorized in rare exceptions

This massive installation was carried out outside the legal framework provided by a European directive and the French Data Protection Act

The National Commission on Informatics and Liberty (CNIL), a French administrative regulatory body, started an investigation against the French Minister of the Interior [1][2]. The Minister, Gérald Darmanin ordered an investigation [2].

• [1] https://nitter.oksocial.net/CNIL/status/1724745047537488019 [French]
• [2] https://web.archive.org/web/20231121093507/https://www.ouest-france.fr/politique/gerald-darmanin/entretien-gerald-darmanin-lantisemitisme-le-signe-dune-societe-qui-ne-va-pas-tres-bien-938b76ce-856c-11ee-9632-b62f00689e79 [French]

La Cnil […] annonce l’ouverture d’une enquête contre le ministère de l’Intérieur. Elle soupçonne la police d’utiliser un logiciel de reconnaissance faciale, depuis 2015, en dehors de tout cadre légal. Qu’en est-il ?

(CNIL suspects the police are using facial recognition outside any legal framework. Comments? - Gérald Darmanin’s answer: The news is true. I ordered an investigation.)

the White House has, for the past decade, provided more than $6 million to the program, which allows the targeting of the records of any calls that use AT&T’s infrastructure

the program takes advantage of numerous “loopholes” in federal privacy law

the DAS program has been used to produce location information on criminal suspects and their known associates, a practice deemed unconstitutional without a warrant

(This website is a bit annoying.)

See https://monero.town/post/968066

Onion http://rurcblzhmdk22kttfkel2zduhyu3r6to7knyc7wiorzrx5gw4c3lftad.onion/

This free email provider is not for everyone. Sometimes a Cockmail address is not accepted to register something. Sometimes, though not often, another email provider may indiscriminately block email from Cock.li. Afaik Cock.li<->Proton, Cock.li<->Tuta work.

PS: Admin, Vincent Canfield @vc@shitposter.club

See also: Fifth Circuit says law enforcement doesn’t need warrants to search phones at the border https://monero.town/post/402125

The app store “collects and sends data […] This includes information like device model, brand, country, timezone, screen size, view events, click events, logtime of events, and a unique KID ID,”

Hancock didn’t return the tablet to her daughter until after making changes to protect her daughter’s privacy.

[She] even installed Tor, a browser that is designed to protect the anonymity of its user.

An awesome Mom, like Mrs. Roberts from xkcd!

A storefront, said Ortis, is a fake business or entity, either online or bricks-and-mortar, set up by police or intelligence agencies.

The plan, he said, was to have criminals use the storefront — an online end-to-end encryption service called Tutanota — to allow authorities to collect intelligence about them.

Tutanota (now Tuta) denies this: https://tuta.com/blog/tutanota-not-a-honeypot

These changes radically expand the capability of EU governments to surveil their citizens by ensuring cryptographic keys under government control can be used to intercept encrypted web traffic

This enables the government of any EU member state to issue website certificates for interception and surveillance

https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2023/qualified-web-authentication-certificates-qwacs-in-eidas/

The browser ecosystem is global, not EU-bounded. Once a mechanism like QWACs is implemented in browsers, it is open to abuse

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EIDAS

The proposal would force internet companies to place a backdoor in web browsers to let them perform a man-in-the-middle attack, deceiving users into thinking that they were communicating with a server they requested, when, in fact, they would be communicating directly with the EU government. […] If passed, the EU would be able to hack into any internet-enabled device, reading any sensitive or encrypted contents without the user's knowledge

See also: https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2023/11/2/eu-digital-identity-framework-eidas-another-kind-of-chat-control/

SimpleX Chat is still a relatively early stage platform (the mobile apps were released in March 2022) But in the end, SimpleX will be our choice, right? Or at least for most of us.

here: SimpleX-Chat Github

[Edit 2: Read the admin’s “reasoning” and comments here or see PS below. The clearnet site is up again. The onion versions = 100% up tme for me]

[Edit: As of writing this (2023-11-01) their clearnet server is down, while the onion version is working. Cock.li is exactly like this… Relatively rarely but randomly it’s down. Kind of irresponsible but it’s just like that. Interestingly, though, onion is up and clearnet is down. Usually opposite.]

Onion http://rurcblzhmdk22kttfkel2zduhyu3r6to7knyc7wiorzrx5gw4c3lftad.onion/

Cockbox on kycnot.me - https://kycnot.me/service/cockbox

(From their webpage)

Cock.li is your go-to solution for professional E-mail and XMPP addresses. Since 2013 cock.li has provided stable E-mail services to an ever-increasing number of users. Cock.li allows registration and usage using Tor and other privacy services (proxies, VPNs) and thanks to continued funding by its users is certain to stay free forever.

Cock.li (aka Cockmail) is a Tor-friendly, privacy-focused, soon-to-be-10-year-old free email provider (IMAP, POP, XMPP, Webmail). Although currently (since around 2021) a new registration is invite-only, the admin @vc now states on their website:

E-mail is a Human Right!

Oppressive governments are using dirty tricks to try and force e-mail providers to require phone numbers or other controlled integrations to register. We will never allow these crimes against our userbase. We will stand up for the right to register for e-mail without being surveilled, and demand this right to be recognized globally. Public registration re-opens on cock.li's 10th birthday, 20 November.

Probably people here know this service pretty well, but some important points:

• Their email addresses are sometimes blacklisted when you want to use them, because in the past the service was abused by spammers. So this provider may not be suitable for normal users/normal usage. Its “technical scores” may be low too, when checked e.g. via https://internet.nl/mail/ If you think this is sketchy and its name is weird, it is. It’s not for you, so please just ignore it.

• A cock.li account may be great to have if you want to sign up and use it anonymously always via onion (something you can’t do with Proton or Tutanota), perhaps with PGP. Maybe great to use on Tails OS too.

• Their service was not very stable in the past. In recent years, it’s been rather stable and very fast even via onion. Pop/Imap via Tor works perfectly. Cock.li onion may load 100 times faster than that of Proton.

• Custom domains are not supported! Consider Disroot or Tutanota if you need them and would like to pay with Monero.

• They are one of the earliest v3 onion providers. In contrast, Proton was so slow to migrate from v2 to v3 (even after v2 got obsolete). Cock.li is also one of the oldest mail providers that started accepting BTC and XMR donations. So probably they’re extremely well-funded (you know why).

• If you use Thunderbird, set up your account manually (its automatic setup probably doesn’t work right).

For more info, visit their webpage. Please DO NOT abuse this based cypherpunk service.

PS. Vincent Canfield (vc@shitposter.club) wrote on September 23, 2023:

Good morning, CISA is now calling cock.li a "Malicious E-mail Domain" and implies this is because it's not "publicly available". So, cock.li will once again open to the public on its 10th birthday, 20 November. #StopRansomware

https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-263a

For those who don't remember, a previous CISA advisory which recommended "service providers strengthen their user validation and verification systems to prohibit misuse of their services" shortly predated cock.li going invite only.

https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-116a

I'm sure if cock.li added phone number verification these joint statements would go away. Everyone sees what's happening, you want to force all providers to link to identities so you can surveil people. Cock.li is never adding that bullshit.

privacy is often considered a tabu when talking about money, despite being a well-accepted fundamental human right for other topics. The growing development of high-surveillance financial tools often creates controversy and conflict of interest against privacy cryptocurrencies.

[We] asked ChatGPT to pick three privacy cryptocurrencies:

The AI responded with its top 3 picks being Monero (XMR), ZCash (ZEC), and Dash (DASH).

“Renowned for its unparalleled privacy features, Monero uses ring signatures, ring confidential transactions, and stealth addresses to anonymize all transaction details. By concealing the identities of the sender and receiver, as well as the transaction amount, Monero makes financial data tracking nearly impossible, ensuring complete discretion for the users.”

— ChatGPT-4

Send me your seed words.

"Arguing that you don't care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don't care about free speech because you have nothing to say."

—Edward Snowden

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nothing_to_hide_argument

1️⃣ Completely normal photos, such as holiday pictures 🏞️ are considered suspicious.

2️⃣ So our private family photos or the chats and pictures from your sexting yesterday 🍑🍆 also end up on an official table. So we can throw privacy in the bin 🚮

Chances are high that most of your European friends have never heard of chat control. So let them know about the danger and what you think about the chat control proposal.

“The European Commission launched an attack on our civil rights with chat control. I contacted my local MEP to tell him that I oppose the proposal. You can do so too! This Website I found will help you write an e-mail to an MEP using A.I.”

exchanges may randomly use this to freeze and block funds from users, claiming these were "flagged" […]. You are left hostage to their arbitrary decision […]. If you choose to sidestep their invasive process, they might just hold onto your funds indefinitely.

The criminals are using stolen identities from companies that gathered them thanks to these very same regulations that were supposed to combat them.

KYC does not protect individuals; rather, it's a threat to our privacy, freedom, security and integrity.

• For individuals in areas with poor record-keeping, […] homeless or transient, obtaining these documents can be challenging, if not impossible.

PS: Spanish speakers: KYC? NO PARA MÍ

Cloudflare-free link for Tor/Tails users: https://web.archive.org/web/20230926042518/https://balkaninsight.com/2023/09/25/who-benefits-inside-the-eus-fight-over-scanning-for-child-sex-content/

It would introduce a complex legal architecture reliant on AI tools for detecting images, videos and speech – so-called ‘client-side scanning’ – containing sexual abuse against minors and attempts to groom children.

If the regulation undermines encryption, it risks introducing new vulnerabilities, critics argue. “Who will benefit from the legislation?” Gerkens asked. “Not the children.”

Groups like Thorn use everything they can to put this legislation forward, not just because they feel that this is the way forward to combat child sexual abuse, but also because they have a commercial interest in doing so.

they are self-interested in promoting child exploitation as a problem that happens “online,” and then proposing quick (and profitable) technical solutions as a remedy to what is in reality a deep social and cultural problem. (…) I don’t think governments understand just how expensive and fallible these systems are

the regulation has […] been met with alarm from privacy advocates and tech specialists who say it will unleash a massive new surveillance system and threaten the use of end-to-end encryption, currently the ultimate way to secure digital communications

A Dutch government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: “The Netherlands has serious concerns with regard to the current proposals to detect unknown CSAM and address grooming, as current technologies lead to a high number of false positives.” “The resulting infringement of fundamental rights is not proportionate.”

As enacted, the OSB allows the government to force companies to build technology that can scan regardless of encryption–in other words, build a backdoor.

Paradoxically, U.K. lawmakers have created these new risks in the name of online safety.

The U.K. government has made some recent statements indicating that it actually realizes that getting around end-to-end encryption isn’t compatible with protecting user privacy. But

The problem is, in the U.K. as in the U.S., people do not agree about what type of content is harmful for kids. Putting that decision in the hands of government regulators will lead to politicized censorship decisions.

The OSB will also lead to harmful age-verification systems. This violates fundamental principles about anonymous and simple access

See also: Britain Admits Defeat in Controversial Fight to Break Encryption

Although the UK government has said that it now won’t force unproven technology on tech companies, […] the controversial clauses remain within the legislation, which is still likely to pass into law.

the continued existence of the powers within the law means encryption-breaking surveillance could still be introduced in the future.

So all ‘until it’s technically feasible’ means is opening the door to scanning in future rather than scanning today. It’s not a change

The implications of the British government backing down, even partially, will reverberate far beyond the UK

“It’s huge in terms of arresting the type of permissive international precedent that this would set […]. The UK was the first jurisdiction to be pushing this kind of mass surveillance. It stops that momentum. And that’s huge for the world.”