German Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons intercepted a Russian Su-24MR tactical reconnaissance aircraft near Latvian territorial waters on Saturday (June 1st).
The incident was reported by the Team Luftwaffe, which shared photos on social media.
The Su-24MR, a special reconnaissance variant of the Su-24 tactical bomber, was identified without a flight plan or radio communication. These aircraft are capable of all-weather operations and are equipped with sophisticated electronic warfare and surveillance systems.
The interception was conducted from Lielvārde Air Base in Latvia, part of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission.
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO has intensified its air policing missions over the Baltic states. Germany, participating in these missions since 2005, has annually contributed to the Reinforced Air Policing Baltic States for at least four months with a joint deployment contingent, including flying units and support forces.
The NATO Baltic Air Policing mission, operational since 2004, ensures the integrity of the airspace over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which lack the resources to patrol their skies independently. This mission serves as a collective and defensive peacetime measure, highlighting NATO’s commitment to the security of its member states.
Russia’s brutal ongoing invasion of Ukraine has provided US intelligence services with a rare opening to recruit Kremlin insiders furious with the handling of the war.
“Disaffection creates a once-in-a-generation opportunity for us,” said CIA Director Bill Burns last year during a speech in the United Kingdom. “We’re very much open for business.”
“That business is the exchange of information that the asset or agent would provide for something that they want,” said David McCloskey, former CIA officer and author of Moscow X. “We want people who have some sense of what [Russian] leaders’ priorities are – what they’re trying to accomplish.”
The ongoing recruitment effort is far from a state secret. The CIA has released Russian-language videos on social media appealing to the patriotism of disaffected Russians with access to information that could be helpful to the US.
The effort highlights the evolution of an intelligence service that has historically conducted its essential mission of countering national security threats and informing policymakers under a shroud of secrecy.
Indeed, until the CIA’s internally unpopular and short-lived director, James Schlesinger, finally posted a sign on a highway marking the site of the ultra-secret organization’s Virginia headquarters in 1973, its very location had been shielded from the public.
Fast forward to today, when the spy agency is not only ubiquitous across social media platforms, it is actively using its newfound public-facing presence to accomplish one of CIA’s primary objectives: recruiting foreign spies to steal secrets.
Posts have included step-by-step instructions for would-be Russian informants on how to avoid detection by Russia’s security services by using virtual private networks, or VPNs, and the Tor web browser to anonymously and through encryption contact the agency on the so-called Dark Web.
The FBI launched a similar effort aimed at recruiting Russian government sources in the US, including geo-targeting social media ads to phones located near Russia’s embassy in Washington.
"This direct appeal is an unusual approach, but one which could prove effective in reaching a Russian populace with few options to express their discontent,” said Douglas London, a former CIA station chief posted abroad. “Russians angry with the Kremlin’s state-sanctioned corruption and abuse, with no way to act openly, are left with few alternatives other than finding external support.”
But while the technology is new, espionage has underpinned, and often undermined, US-Russian relations for decades.
That secret battle between intelligence services is the focus of a new CNN-BBC documentary – “Secrets and Spies” – which premieres Sunday at 10 p.m. ET.
With never before heard interviews from Cold War spies and the traitors who sealed their fate, “Secrets and Spies” tracks the operatives who worked behind the scenes to steal and share vital intelligence as the world stood on the brink of nuclear war.
Over 30 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the world has returned to a period of great power conflict. In his latest book, CNN chief national security analyst Jim Sciutto describes it as “a definitive break between the post-Cold War era and an entirely new and uncertain one.”
Like the Cold War of the past, espionage remains a vital tool for both sides of the latest conflict, as evidenced by tech-savvy US intelligence officers attempting to recruit new assets in plain sight, and Russian-linked operatives reportedly increasing operations across Europe.
While espionage is illegal in every nation in the world, and undercover operatives have certainly been used for nefarious purposes such as sabotage, assassination, and election interference, “Secrets and Spies” pulls back the veil on a lesser-known, historically critical function of spying: to reduce uncertainty and miscalculation among nuclear-armed adversaries.
As the documentary underscores, the espionage lessons of the Cold War could very well determine future global stability.
“You have to know your enemy,” said CNN presidential historian Tim Naftali. “If you don’t, you can scare your enemy into doing something that neither of you wants to see happen.”
Ahead of the 35th anniversary of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Massacre, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) urges the Chinese government to release 27 individuals involved in the pro-democracy movement as participants, supporters, or advocates for accountability. The 27 are currently in detention or prison on the mainland or in Hong Kong.
For 35 years, all top Chinese leaders, from Li Peng to Xi Jinping, have been fixated on erasing memories of June 4 by persecuting those who peacefully seek accountability. Everyone who cares about justice should publicly call on Chinese authorities to end decades of brutal enforcement of amnesia,” said Renee Xia, CHRD director.
CHRD urges all democracies to mark this June 4 by calling on Beijing to immediately and unconditionally release these and all other prisoners of conscience in China.
Leaders of democracies engaging with the Chinese government should publicly condemn that government for its ongoing punishment of participants and supporters of the 1989 prodemocracy movement. That repression aimed at stamping out activists’ peaceful actions promoting human rights, rule of law and democracy.
We ask allies in the global struggle for human rights and democracy to commemorate and demand justice for victims of the Tiananmen Massacre, and in particular, for three 1989 prodemocracy leaders who were subsequently persecuted to death after being subjected to arbitrary imprisonment and inhumane punishment: Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), Yang Tongyan (杨同彦), Li Wangyang (李旺阳).
Some of the 27 individuals highlighted in this statement played leadership roles or participated in the protests in 1989 as young students; others were labor organizers acting in solidarity with the students. Some had previously served wrongful prison terms for their role in 1989 and resumed their activities after they were released.
Others who became activists after 1989 have been pivotal in sustaining the memory of Tiananmen across China and in Hong Kong. They too have been targeted with harsh reprisal as the Chinese Communist Party state seeks to whitewash its history of atrocities.
The following list of 27 cases is far from being complete, yet it is a window to the severity, scale, and persistence of reprisals by the Chinese government over the past 35 years.
1. 1989 participants serving prison sentences or in pre-trial detention for continuing activism:
• Zhou Guoqiang (周国强) served prison time for organizing a labor strike in support of student protests in Beijing in 1989. He also served 4 years in a re-education-through-labor camp from 1994 to 1998, also for labor organizing work. He was arrested for online comments in October 2023. His whereabouts and the charge against him remain unknown.
• Guangdong activist Guo Feixiong (郭飞雄) has been serving a six-year sentence since 2015 for his human rights activism. Guo took part in the 1989 movement as a student in Shanghai.
• China Democracy Party member Chen Shuqing (陈树庆) of Hangzhou has been serving a 10.5-year since 2016 for his pro-democracy advocacy. In 1989, Chen participated in the movement as a university student.
• China Democracy Party member Lü Gengsong (吕耿松) has been serving an 11-year sentence since 2016 for his pro-democracy advocacy. Lü was a teacher in Hangzhou who was dismissed in 1993 for supporting the democracy movement.
• Beijing-based lawyer Xia Lin (夏霖) has been serving a 11-year sentence since 2016 for his professional work as a lawyer. Xia participated in the 1989 movement as a student at the Southwest Institute of Political Science and Law in Chongqing.
• Xinjiang activist Zhao Haitong (赵海通) has been serving a 14-year sentence since 2014 for his activities as a human rights defender. He was jailed in the aftermath of the 1989 massacre.
• Xu Na (许那) participated in the student protests, including a hunger strike, on Tiananmen Square in 1989. She was arrested in 2020 and sentenced to 8 years in jail for “using an evil cult to disrupt law enforcement”.
• Sichuan activist Chen Yunfei (陈云飞) served a four-year sentence from 2015-2019, in part for organizing a memorial to June Fourth victims. Chen participated in the 1989 movement as a student at the China Agricultural University in Beijing.
• Xu Guang (徐光), participated in student pro-democracy movements in 1986 and 1989, was arrested in 2022, and is now serving a 4-year sentence on the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province.
• Huang Xiaomin (黄晓敏), a student participant in the 1989 movement, was arrested in 2021 and sentenced to four years on the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” in Sichuan province.
• Cao Peizhi (曹培植), a participant in the 1989 prodemocracy movement and eyewitness to the Tiananmen massacre, was detained in 2022 and is now serving a 2.2-year prison sentence after his conviction for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” in Henan province.
• Zhang Zhongshun (张忠顺), a student participant in the 1989 protests; later, as a professor, he talked about June 4th in his class in 2007 and was reported to the police. He was subsequently jailed for three years, and is now detained for continuing to support activism, and faces a charge of subversion, in Shandong province.
• Wang Yifei (王一飞), has disappeared into police custody since his detention in 2021. He was jailed for two years in 2018-19 on the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” Before his arrest in 2018, he had for several years been calling for justice for 1989 victims, urging people to remember those who died in the June 4th massacre.
• Shi Tingfu (史庭福) provided support to the student protesters in 1989. He was detained for staging a public vigil and delivering a passionate speech about remembering the victims of the Tiananmen massacre in Nanjing on June 4, 2017. He was arrested in January 2024, and is awaiting trial on several charges including spreading false information, and inciting terrorism and extremism in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
2. Detainees and prisoners punished for, among other actions, commemorating Tiananmen, and seeking justice:
• Zhang Haitao (张海涛) serving a 19-year prison sentence in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region since 2015 upon conviction of “inciting subversion of state power” & “providing intelligence overseas.” Among other things, he was punished for trying to commemorate June 4th on the 25th anniversary of the massacre.
• Qin Yongmin (秦永敏) openly called for justice for victims of Tiananmen Massacre and release of all political prisoners in 1993, for which he was sent to a re-education labor camp for two years. He was arrested in 2015, and sentenced to 13 years in jail on the charge of subversion in Hubei province.
• Huang Qi (黄琦), founder of an organization with a website named “6.4 Tianwang” to report on human rights news in the spirit of the 1989 pro-democracy movement, was imprisoned for the second time in 2016 on charges of “leaking” and “providing” “state secrets” overseas,and is currently serving a 12-year term in prison.
• Yang Shaozheng (杨绍政), a professor, who was arrested in 2021, and sentenced to 4.5 years for inciting subversion in Guizhou province. He posted information online about the number of student protesters killed in 1989 in a WeChat group in June 2019. He was summoned by police and interrogated, during which, he was subjected to tortured.
• Zeng Yuxuan (曾雨璇), jailed for six months in Hong Kong for planning to commemorate June 4th on the eve of June 4, 2023. was After being forcibly deported to the mainland in October 2023, she has since disappeared.
• Tong Hao (仝浩), born in 1987, a doctor, was jailed for 1.5 years for posting about June 4th to mark the anniversary in 2020. He was arrested in August 2023 and has since been disappeared into police custody in Jiangsu province.
• Yu Qian (余钱) held a vigil and hunger strike to mark the anniversary of June 4th in 2010 and police summoned him for questioning. In October 2022, he was arrested by police in Hubei province after he posted online “Speaking out on 6.4 is not guilty of any crime, eavesdropping on citizens’ communication is” and challenged the government’s harsh COVID-19 policies. He has since been forcibly disappeared.
• Lee Cheuk-yan (李卓人), an organizer of Hong Kong mass demonstration in support of Tiananmen protests in 1989, who also organized a donation drive in HK and delivered the donations to students on Tiananmen Square, is a leading figure in the annual June 4th candlelight vigils in HK since 1989, is now detained waiting for trial in HK on national security charges.
• Jimmy Lai (黎智英), a longtime supporter of the 1989 movement and exile student leaders from Hong Kong; now detained, convicted of some charges, and waiting for trial for organizing candlelight vigils on the anniversary of Tiananmen in HK in 2020.
• Albert Ho (何俊仁), a longtime supporter of the 1989 movement, lawyer and advocate for protection of rights lawyers on the mainland, was arrested by Hong Kong’s national security police in March 2023 while he was out on bail, since August 2022for “illegal 6.4 assembly” to hold a candlelight vigil on the anniversary of Tiananmen in 2020, in Hong Kong.
• Chow Hang-Tung(邹幸彤), jailed for 1 year and 3 months in Hong Kong for “inciting others to participate in assembly to commemorate June 4th” to mark the anniversaries in 2020 and 2021, has recently been arrested again (while already in prison) on “seditious intent” charges under Hong Kong’s new national security law allegedly relating to June 4. She is also awaiting trial on an earlier charge of “inciting subversion” in Hong Kong.
• Joshua Wong (黄之锋), jailed for 10 months in HK for “illegal gathering” to hold a candlelight vigil for the June 4th anniversary in 2021, is now detained and awaiting trial on the charge of “inciting subversion” in Hong Kong.
• Claudia Mo (毛孟静), a journalist who reported in Beijing on the student protests and the massacre in 1989, is now detained in Hong Kong waiting for trial on the charge of “inciting subversion.”
3. Prominent figures in the 1989 prodemocracy movement: Persecuted to death
• Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波) died in police control in July 2017 from liver cancer. Liu had been serving an 11-year sentence since 2009 for his leading role in the “Charter 08” campaign. A university lecturer in 1989, he was jailed for 18 months for taking part in the 1989 movement.
• Jiangsu writer Yang Tongyan (杨同彦) died in November 2017 from brain cancer. He had only been granted medical parole in August 2017, weeks before his death, despite his family’s years-long efforts to secure his release for medical treatment. Yang had been serving a 12-year sentence handed down in 2006 for his political activism. He was jailed for 10 years for participating in the 1989 movement.
• Labor activist Li Wangyang (李旺阳) died under suspicious circumstances on June 6, 2012 while in a hospital under police surveillance in Shaoyang, Hunan province. Li, a labor leader in the 1989 democracy movement, was sentenced to a total of 23 years in prison. Chinese authorities claimed that Li committed suicide by hanging himself in his hospital room, a claim his family disputed as Li was blind and deaf from torture and would not have been physically capable of hanging himself. Against the wishes of Li’s family, Hunan authorities conducted their own autopsy and then cremated his body.
In the immediate aftermath of the massacre, many democratic governments called on Beijing to end its repression and account for its actions, especially the killings of peaceful protestors. But as time passed and Beijing grew into an economic powerhouse and resisted that pressure, many democracies muted their concerns about the 1989 massacre, the impunity, and reprisals against its participants.
“Accountability for June 4th atrocities three decades ago might have prevented subsequent crimes against humanity by the Chinese state, and saved lives. To keep any hopes alive, anyone concerned about justice should stand with the courageous activists as long as they suffer reprisals for seeking justice,” said Xia.
Ahead of the 35th anniversary of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Massacre, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) urges the Chinese government to release 27 individuals involved in the pro-democracy movement as participants, supporters, or advocates for accountability. The 27 are currently in detention or prison on the mainland or in Hong Kong.
For 35 years, all top Chinese leaders, from Li Peng to Xi Jinping, have been fixated on erasing memories of June 4 by persecuting those who peacefully seek accountability. Everyone who cares about justice should publicly call on Chinese authorities to end decades of brutal enforcement of amnesia,” said Renee Xia, CHRD director.
CHRD urges all democracies to mark this June 4 by calling on Beijing to immediately and unconditionally release these and all other prisoners of conscience in China.
Leaders of democracies engaging with the Chinese government should publicly condemn that government for its ongoing punishment of participants and supporters of the 1989 prodemocracy movement. That repression aimed at stamping out activists’ peaceful actions promoting human rights, rule of law and democracy.
We ask allies in the global struggle for human rights and democracy to commemorate and demand justice for victims of the Tiananmen Massacre, and in particular, for three 1989 prodemocracy leaders who were subsequently persecuted to death after being subjected to arbitrary imprisonment and inhumane punishment: Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), Yang Tongyan (杨同彦), Li Wangyang (李旺阳).
Some of the 27 individuals highlighted in this statement played leadership roles or participated in the protests in 1989 as young students; others were labor organizers acting in solidarity with the students. Some had previously served wrongful prison terms for their role in 1989 and resumed their activities after they were released.
Others who became activists after 1989 have been pivotal in sustaining the memory of Tiananmen across China and in Hong Kong. They too have been targeted with harsh reprisal as the Chinese Communist Party state seeks to whitewash its history of atrocities.
The following list of 27 cases is far from being complete, yet it is a window to the severity, scale, and persistence of reprisals by the Chinese government over the past 35 years.
1. 1989 participants serving prison sentences or in pre-trial detention for continuing activism:
• Zhou Guoqiang (周国强) served prison time for organizing a labor strike in support of student protests in Beijing in 1989. He also served 4 years in a re-education-through-labor camp from 1994 to 1998, also for labor organizing work. He was arrested for online comments in October 2023. His whereabouts and the charge against him remain unknown.
• Guangdong activist Guo Feixiong (郭飞雄) has been serving a six-year sentence since 2015 for his human rights activism. Guo took part in the 1989 movement as a student in Shanghai.
• China Democracy Party member Chen Shuqing (陈树庆) of Hangzhou has been serving a 10.5-year since 2016 for his pro-democracy advocacy. In 1989, Chen participated in the movement as a university student.
• China Democracy Party member Lü Gengsong (吕耿松) has been serving an 11-year sentence since 2016 for his pro-democracy advocacy. Lü was a teacher in Hangzhou who was dismissed in 1993 for supporting the democracy movement.
• Beijing-based lawyer Xia Lin (夏霖) has been serving a 11-year sentence since 2016 for his professional work as a lawyer. Xia participated in the 1989 movement as a student at the Southwest Institute of Political Science and Law in Chongqing.
• Xinjiang activist Zhao Haitong (赵海通) has been serving a 14-year sentence since 2014 for his activities as a human rights defender. He was jailed in the aftermath of the 1989 massacre.
• Xu Na (许那) participated in the student protests, including a hunger strike, on Tiananmen Square in 1989. She was arrested in 2020 and sentenced to 8 years in jail for “using an evil cult to disrupt law enforcement”.
• Sichuan activist Chen Yunfei (陈云飞) served a four-year sentence from 2015-2019, in part for organizing a memorial to June Fourth victims. Chen participated in the 1989 movement as a student at the China Agricultural University in Beijing.
• Xu Guang (徐光), participated in student pro-democracy movements in 1986 and 1989, was arrested in 2022, and is now serving a 4-year sentence on the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province.
• Huang Xiaomin (黄晓敏), a student participant in the 1989 movement, was arrested in 2021 and sentenced to four years on the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” in Sichuan province.
• Cao Peizhi (曹培植), a participant in the 1989 prodemocracy movement and eyewitness to the Tiananmen massacre, was detained in 2022 and is now serving a 2.2-year prison sentence after his conviction for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” in Henan province.
• Zhang Zhongshun (张忠顺), a student participant in the 1989 protests; later, as a professor, he talked about June 4th in his class in 2007 and was reported to the police. He was subsequently jailed for three years, and is now detained for continuing to support activism, and faces a charge of subversion, in Shandong province.
• Wang Yifei (王一飞), has disappeared into police custody since his detention in 2021. He was jailed for two years in 2018-19 on the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” Before his arrest in 2018, he had for several years been calling for justice for 1989 victims, urging people to remember those who died in the June 4th massacre.
• Shi Tingfu (史庭福) provided support to the student protesters in 1989. He was detained for staging a public vigil and delivering a passionate speech about remembering the victims of the Tiananmen massacre in Nanjing on June 4, 2017. He was arrested in January 2024, and is awaiting trial on several charges including spreading false information, and inciting terrorism and extremism in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
2. Detainees and prisoners punished for, among other actions, commemorating Tiananmen, and seeking justice:
• Zhang Haitao (张海涛) serving a 19-year prison sentence in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region since 2015 upon conviction of “inciting subversion of state power” & “providing intelligence overseas.” Among other things, he was punished for trying to commemorate June 4th on the 25th anniversary of the massacre.
• Qin Yongmin (秦永敏) openly called for justice for victims of Tiananmen Massacre and release of all political prisoners in 1993, for which he was sent to a re-education labor camp for two years. He was arrested in 2015, and sentenced to 13 years in jail on the charge of subversion in Hubei province.
• Huang Qi (黄琦), founder of an organization with a website named “6.4 Tianwang” to report on human rights news in the spirit of the 1989 pro-democracy movement, was imprisoned for the second time in 2016 on charges of “leaking” and “providing” “state secrets” overseas,and is currently serving a 12-year term in prison.
• Yang Shaozheng (杨绍政), a professor, who was arrested in 2021, and sentenced to 4.5 years for inciting subversion in Guizhou province. He posted information online about the number of student protesters killed in 1989 in a WeChat group in June 2019. He was summoned by police and interrogated, during which, he was subjected to tortured.
• Zeng Yuxuan (曾雨璇), jailed for six months in Hong Kong for planning to commemorate June 4th on the eve of June 4, 2023. was After being forcibly deported to the mainland in October 2023, she has since disappeared.
• Tong Hao (仝浩), born in 1987, a doctor, was jailed for 1.5 years for posting about June 4th to mark the anniversary in 2020. He was arrested in August 2023 and has since been disappeared into police custody in Jiangsu province.
• Yu Qian (余钱) held a vigil and hunger strike to mark the anniversary of June 4th in 2010 and police summoned him for questioning. In October 2022, he was arrested by police in Hubei province after he posted online “Speaking out on 6.4 is not guilty of any crime, eavesdropping on citizens’ communication is” and challenged the government’s harsh COVID-19 policies. He has since been forcibly disappeared.
• Lee Cheuk-yan (李卓人), an organizer of Hong Kong mass demonstration in support of Tiananmen protests in 1989, who also organized a donation drive in HK and delivered the donations to students on Tiananmen Square, is a leading figure in the annual June 4th candlelight vigils in HK since 1989, is now detained waiting for trial in HK on national security charges.
• Jimmy Lai (黎智英), a longtime supporter of the 1989 movement and exile student leaders from Hong Kong; now detained, convicted of some charges, and waiting for trial for organizing candlelight vigils on the anniversary of Tiananmen in HK in 2020.
• Albert Ho (何俊仁), a longtime supporter of the 1989 movement, lawyer and advocate for protection of rights lawyers on the mainland, was arrested by Hong Kong’s national security police in March 2023 while he was out on bail, since August 2022for “illegal 6.4 assembly” to hold a candlelight vigil on the anniversary of Tiananmen in 2020, in Hong Kong.
• Chow Hang-Tung(邹幸彤), jailed for 1 year and 3 months in Hong Kong for “inciting others to participate in assembly to commemorate June 4th” to mark the anniversaries in 2020 and 2021, has recently been arrested again (while already in prison) on “seditious intent” charges under Hong Kong’s new national security law allegedly relating to June 4. She is also awaiting trial on an earlier charge of “inciting subversion” in Hong Kong.
• Joshua Wong (黄之锋), jailed for 10 months in HK for “illegal gathering” to hold a candlelight vigil for the June 4th anniversary in 2021, is now detained and awaiting trial on the charge of “inciting subversion” in Hong Kong.
• Claudia Mo (毛孟静), a journalist who reported in Beijing on the student protests and the massacre in 1989, is now detained in Hong Kong waiting for trial on the charge of “inciting subversion.”
3. Prominent figures in the 1989 prodemocracy movement: Persecuted to death
• Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波) died in police control in July 2017 from liver cancer. Liu had been serving an 11-year sentence since 2009 for his leading role in the “Charter 08” campaign. A university lecturer in 1989, he was jailed for 18 months for taking part in the 1989 movement.
• Jiangsu writer Yang Tongyan (杨同彦) died in November 2017 from brain cancer. He had only been granted medical parole in August 2017, weeks before his death, despite his family’s years-long efforts to secure his release for medical treatment. Yang had been serving a 12-year sentence handed down in 2006 for his political activism. He was jailed for 10 years for participating in the 1989 movement.
• Labor activist Li Wangyang (李旺阳) died under suspicious circumstances on June 6, 2012 while in a hospital under police surveillance in Shaoyang, Hunan province. Li, a labor leader in the 1989 democracy movement, was sentenced to a total of 23 years in prison. Chinese authorities claimed that Li committed suicide by hanging himself in his hospital room, a claim his family disputed as Li was blind and deaf from torture and would not have been physically capable of hanging himself. Against the wishes of Li’s family, Hunan authorities conducted their own autopsy and then cremated his body.
In the immediate aftermath of the massacre, many democratic governments called on Beijing to end its repression and account for its actions, especially the killings of peaceful protestors. But as time passed and Beijing grew into an economic powerhouse and resisted that pressure, many democracies muted their concerns about the 1989 massacre, the impunity, and reprisals against its participants.
“Accountability for June 4th atrocities three decades ago might have prevented subsequent crimes against humanity by the Chinese state, and saved lives. To keep any hopes alive, anyone concerned about justice should stand with the courageous activists as long as they suffer reprisals for seeking justice,” said Xia.
Der slowakische Moderator Michal Kovačič wagt am 26. Mai in seiner Polit-Show „Na Telo“ eine Kritik, die ihm den Job kostet. Er sagt am Ende der Sendung: „Wir stehen unter Druck von Politiker*innen und der Leitung der Mediengruppe Markiza.“
Markiza wollte die Show verfrüht in die Sommerpause schicken, um über eine Neuausrichtung des Programms nachzudenken. Das hatte der Sender zwei Tage vorher bekannt gegeben. Und Kovačič forderte nun also öffentlich, dass sie weitergeführt werde, und warnte vor einer „Orbánifizierung“ der slowakischen Medienlandschaft. Einen Tag später, am 27. Mai, ist „Na Telo“ abgesetzt und Kovačič entlassen.
Markiza erklärte, Kovačič habe die Sendezeit missbraucht, um persönliche Meinungen zu äußern, was gegen medienethische Standards verstoße. Zensurvorwürfe wies der Sender als „unfair und unbegründet“ zurück. Der Fall Kovačič ist ein prominentes Beispiel für den Umgang von Politik und Wirtschaft mit Journalist*innen in der Slowakei.
Seit dem Amtsantritt der linksnationalen Regierungskoalition unter Premierminister Robert Fico im Herbst 2023 wird der Staat im Schnellverfahren umgebaut: Korruptionsbekämpfung wird erschwert, Ukrainehilfen eingestellt. Schon immer ist das Land gespalten zwischen prorussischen und antieuropäischen Kräften. Verbannung „feindlicher“ Medien
Die Regierung unter Fico treibt diese Polarisierung weiter voran. Und sie strebt eine staatliche Kontrolle der Medien an. Politikerinnen ignorieren Talkshoweinladungen und Fragen von unliebsamen Reporterinnen.
Eines der ersten Gesetze, das Fico nach seiner Wiederwahl umsetzen wollte, war die Verbannung „feindlicher“ Medien, darunter auch Markiza. Der Privatsender ist der größte und meist gesehene Sender des Landes. Vor allem seine politischen Sonntagsshows sind beliebt, auch die von Kovačič. Fico scheiterte mit seinem Gesetz. Aber es verdeutlicht seinen persönlichen Krieg gegen die Medien.
Mitte Mai wurde Premierminister Fico bei einem Attentat lebensbedrohlich verletzt; Politiker*innen fanden schnell einen Sündenbock für die aufgeheizte Stimmung im Land, die ein solches Attentat erst ermöglicht habe: die Medien. Mitglieder der Regierungskoalition bereiteten innerhalb weniger Tage ein Gesetz vor, das die „Medienrhetorik“ regulieren, also Presse und NGOs in die Schranken weisen soll. Die Zeitung Slovak Spectator berichtet, dass die „Kontrolle des Onlineraums“ und ein Recht auf Gegendarstellung in den Entwürfen enthalten seien, ebenso hohe Geldstrafen bei Falschberichterstattung. Mehr ist nicht bekannt.
Journalist durch Auftragsmord getötet
Kritikerinnen befürchten, dass die Regierung mit diesem Gesetz nicht den Hass in der Gesellschaft kontrollieren will, sondern die Medien selbst. Das sei naheliegend, weil der Ton der Regierung seit jeher sehr rau gegenüber Journalistinnen sei, meint Peter Hanak von der Onlinezeitung Aktuality. „Sie nennen uns Ratten und Prostituierte.“
„Heute herrscht Zensur“, sagte der Vorsitzende der Partei Progressive Slowakei, Michal Šimečka, der Zeitung Sme. Diese Zensur hat eine lange Geschichte. Schon 2008, in Ficos erster Amtszeit, ging er verschärft gegen Medien vor. 2017 verließen angesehene Journalist*innen den öffentlich-rechtlichen Sender RTVS, da Manager eingesetzt wurden, die vorher in den Ministerien saßen. Hanak ist einer, der ging. „Schon damals wurden etwa 60 Leute entlassen“, sagt er.
Hanak wechselte zu Aktuality, der Onlinezeitung, für die Journalist Ján Kuciak arbeitete. Kuciak deckte Korruption von Unternehmen und bei hohen Beamten der Regierung auf, kurz darauf, im Jahr 2018, wurde er durch einen Auftragsmord getötet. Auf seinen Tod folgten nie dagewesenen Massenproteste. „Viele verstanden damals, wie wichtig die freie Presse ist und dass das Land die Journalistinnen wirklich schützen muss, meint Matúš Kostolný, Chefredakteur der slowakischen Investigativ-Zeitung Denník N. Einige Politikerinnen, darunter auch Robert Fico, mussten zurücktreten.
Misstrauen in etablierte Medien
Heute aber sind viele von damals wieder an der Macht. Inzwischen hat die Kulturministerin Martina Šimkovičová eine Reform des öffentlich-rechtlichen Senders RTVS vorgeschlagen. Statt RTVS soll es ein staatliches Unternehmen mit neuem Namen geben, das von einem neuen CEO kontrolliert wird, der von einem neuen Rat bestimmt wird, der nominiert wird von: der Regierung.
Die EU-Kommission kritisiert die Pläne, und Tausende demonstrieren seit Jahresbeginn in der Slowakei. Dennoch stimmte die Regierung, die dem Sender „politische Voreingenommenheit“ vorwirft, dem Vorschlag Anfang Mai zu. Nur noch das Parlament muss zustimmen.
Laut einer Umfrage des Meinungsforschungsinstituts Focus und des Demokratiezentrums Globsec bleibt Fernsehen die wichtigste Informationsquelle in der Slowakei, besonders für ältere Wählerinnen. Daher der Regierungsgriff nach den TV-Sendern. Viele Politikerinnen fördern zudem das Misstrauen in etablierte Medien und wenden sich verschwörungsideologischen Medien zu.
Wahlkampf auf Desinformationsseiten
Kulturministerin Šimkovičová hat eigene Desinformationssendungen auf Youtube und Premierminister Fico führte seinen Wahlkampf auf Desinformationsseiten. Einige Politikerinnen nehmen an Livestreams von verschwörungsideologischen Youtuberinnen teil, wie vom verurteilten Extremisten Daniel Bombic, der antisemitische und neofaschistische Botschaften verbreitet.
Im März 2024 waren Slowak*innen laut einem Bericht der unabhängigen Organisation Cedmo Trends mehr Fake News als Qualitätsnachrichten ausgesetzt. Dominika Hajdu, Direktorin des Thinktanks Globsec, bezeichnet das als „riesiges Problem, denn die Bevölkerung ist sehr viel anfälliger für Verschwörungsideologien als andere Gesellschaften in Mittel-Osteuropa “.
Viele unabhängige Journalistinnen kritisieren, Politikerinnen würden ignorieren, wie ihr eigenes Verhalten und Hass in der Gesellschaft in Zusammenhang stünden. Ob die Regierung auch auf ihren eigenen Beitrag zur feindlichen Rhetorik im Land schaut? Auf diese Frage einer Reporterin von Denník N bot Ficos Stellvertreter Robert Kalinak an, ihr einen Spiegel zu kaufen.
Ein riesiger Druck
Der Druck zeigt Wirkung. Vor einigen Wochen wurde Zuzana Kovačič Hanzelová, die Ehefrau von Moderator Kovačič, Ziel einer Hetzkampagne des Youtubers Bombic und legte deshalb eine Pause von ihrer Interviewreihe bei der Tageszeitung Sme ein. Viele Moderator*innen und Hosts politischer Debattenshows verließen in den letzten Monaten ihre Programme.
„Noch haben wir extrem gute und unabhängige Journalist*innen im Land“, sagt Kostolny von Denník N. Fast 100 Markiza-Angestellte fordern die Wiedereinstellung Kovačičs. Auch von anderen Medienhäusern gebe es viel Solidarität für Markiza, sagt Matúš Kostolný. Trotzdem sagt Hanak von Aktuality: „Auf uns Journalisten lastet ein riesiger Druck. Ich glaube, niemand kann gerade über sich selbst sagen, dass er sich sicher fühlt.“
Moldova’s parliament on Thursday (30 May) denounced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as “genocide” in connection with Moscow’s treatment of children in occupied areas, but the assembly’s Moscow-friendly opposition parties refused to take part in the vote.
Sixty deputies in the 101-seat assembly backed the declaration, joining several national parliaments in adopting similar documents and also offering to continue extending assistance to Ukrainians fleeing the conflict.
The more than two-year-old invasion, denounced by pro-European President Maia Sandu, has buffeted the country lying between Ukraine and Moldova, with a large number of drone and missile fragments falling on its territory.
Parliament’s deputy speaker, Doina Gherman, documented the numbers of children killed or missing in the conflict, along with nearly 20,000 taken away to Russia, according to Ukrainian government figures.
Opposition member Reghina Apostolova accused Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) of double standards, saying the chamber should also denounce sufferings of children in the former Yugoslavia. Communist Deputy Oleg Reidman urged caution, saying genocide was a legal term with criteria to be met.
Radu Marian of the ruling PAS rejected opposition objections, saying “These are our neighbours. Thousands of Ukrainian children, the children of refugees, have been housed here.”
Russia rejected allegations that it has abducted or deported Ukrainian children, saying they have been taken to safe areas, away from the conflict.
The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant in March 2023 for Russian President Vladimir Putin, citing the forced transfer of children to Russia.
Group of university students awarded plot after city hall passes plan for 15 to 20 cooperative projects
De Torteltuin, or “Dove Garden”, was born from an existential, if depressingly common, question. A group of young Amsterdammers, most still at university, looked into their futures and asked how they would ever afford to live in their own city.
“It was 2020, we were 22 or 23 years old,” said Iris Luden. “It was a dream. We were fantasising. What if we built our own place? We imagined a kindergarten, growing our own food … We got together every month to talk about it. But slowly, it happened.”
Amsterdam, the sought-after capital of a country in an acute housing crisis, is one of the toughest places in Europe to set up home. Private-sector rents are sky-high – €900 (£770) for a room in shared flat – and you can wait up to 20 years for social housing.
"It’s just so bad,” said Luden, an AI engineer fortunate enough still to be living in her old student accommodation. “People are just constantly on the move, once a year on average. You can’t settle. We wanted somewhere affordable. And a community.”
The group’s vision might have stayed a dream had city hall not passed a plan for 15 to 20 cooperative housing projects within four years, half of them self-built. The aim eventually is for 10% of all new Amsterdam housing stock to be cooperatively owned.
“We started to take things more seriously,” said Lukas Nerl, 28, another Torteltuin member. “We set up subgroups: financing, sustainability, the rest. We had to learn a lot, fast. We registered as an association, wrote a project plan. We applied.”
To their amazement, they were accepted – perhaps, said Nerl, precisely because of their youth, and because, as recent graduates, they might be assumed to be capable of navigating their way through a labyrinth of rules, regulations and bureaucracy.
They secured a team of architects with experience in non-profit cooperative projects, raised the money to pay them, and presented a plan for a four-storey, timber-clad, sustainably built block of 40 apartments, from studios to three-bedders.
Against stiff competition with other projects, De Torteltuin was awarded a plot 20 minutes from the city centre by tram and 45 minutes by bike, in IJburg, a new residential quarter slowly emerging on artificial islands rising from the IJmeer lake.
Through a mixture of loans from a bank and city hall, crowdfunding from friends and family and two bond issues, the 26-member group has raised almost €9m of the estimated €12 to €13m construction cost. With luck, work will begin by year-end.
The cooperative will own the building, with every resident paying a monthly rent, said Enrikos Iossifidis, another member. About a third of the apartments will qualify as social housing, while the most expensive – a family flat – should cost €1,200 a month.
"A decade ago it wouldn’t have been possible,” said Iossifidis. “Even now it’s been a rollercoaster ride: when building costs soared after Russia invaded Ukraine, there was a truly awful moment when we thought it might not happen after all.”
But by late next year or early 2026, the group should be thinking about moving into a carbon-neutral home complete with roof-top solar panels, communal spaces on each floor, guest rooms, a shared toolshed, a stage and a music studio in the basement.
Their adventure is not just about affordable housing, said Luden. “It is very much also about building a real community,” she said. “Some flats are being reserved for people who face even bigger housing challenges – asylum seekers, for example.”
De Torteltuin, said Nerl, “actually sets a vision of future city living. It’s not one of pollution, concrete, high-rises, speculation, ever-rising rents and more unaffordable mortgages. The new homes of the city will be social, sustainable – and affordable.”
- New high-volume 200mm silicon carbide manufacturing facility for power devices and modules, as well as test and packaging, to be built in Catania, Italy - Projected 5 billion euros multi-year investment program including 2 billion euros support provided by the State of Italy in the framework of the EU Chips Act - Catania Silicon Carbide Campus realizes ST’s plan for fully vertically integrated SiC capabilities from R&D to manufacturing, from substrate to module, on one site, enabling automotive and industrial customers in their shift to electrification and higher energy efficiency
STMicroelectronics, a global semiconductor leader serving customers across the spectrum of electronics applications, announces a new high-volume 200mm silicon carbide (“SiC”) manufacturing facility for power devices and modules, as well as test and packaging, to be built in Catania, Italy.Combined with the SiC substrate manufacturing facility being readied on the same site,these facilities will form ST’s Silicon Carbide Campus, realizing the Company’s vision of a fully vertically integrated manufacturing facility for the mass production of SiC on one site.The creation of the new Silicon Carbide Campus is a key milestone to support customers for SiC devices across automotive, industrial and cloud infrastructure applications, as they transition to electrification and seek higher efficiency.
[...]
The Silicon Carbide Campus will serve as the center of ST’s global SiC ecosystem, integrating all steps in the production flow, including SiC substrate development, epitaxial growth processes, 200mm front-end wafer fabrication and module back-end assembly, as well as process R&D, product design, advanced R&D labs for dies, power systems and modules, and full packaging capabilities. This will achieve a first of a kind in Europe for the mass production of 200mm SiC wafers with each step of the process – substrate, epitaxy & front-end, and back-end – using 200 mm technologies for enhanced yields and performances.
The new facility is targeted to start production in 2026 and to ramp to full capacity by 2033, with up to 15,000 wafers per week at full build-out. The total investment is expected to be around five billion euros, with a support of around two billion euros provided by the State of Italy within the framework of the EU Chips Act. Sustainable practices are integral to the design, development, and operation of the Silicon Carbide Campus to ensure the responsible consumption of resources including water and power.
- New high-volume 200mm silicon carbide manufacturing facility for power devices and modules, as well as test and packaging, to be built in Catania, Italy - Projected 5 billion euros multi-year investment program including 2 billion euros support provided by the State of Italy in the framework of the EU Chips Act - Catania Silicon Carbide Campus realizes ST’s plan for fully vertically integrated SiC capabilities from R&D to manufacturing, from substrate to module, on one site, enabling automotive and industrial customers in their shift to electrification and higher energy efficiency
STMicroelectronics, a global semiconductor leader serving customers across the spectrum of electronics applications, announces a new high-volume 200mm silicon carbide (“SiC”) manufacturing facility for power devices and modules, as well as test and packaging, to be built in Catania, Italy.Combined with the SiC substrate manufacturing facility being readied on the same site,these facilities will form ST’s Silicon Carbide Campus, realizing the Company’s vision of a fully vertically integrated manufacturing facility for the mass production of SiC on one site.The creation of the new Silicon Carbide Campus is a key milestone to support customers for SiC devices across automotive, industrial and cloud infrastructure applications, as they transition to electrification and seek higher efficiency.
[...]
The Silicon Carbide Campus will serve as the center of ST’s global SiC ecosystem, integrating all steps in the production flow, including SiC substrate development, epitaxial growth processes, 200mm front-end wafer fabrication and module back-end assembly, as well as process R&D, product design, advanced R&D labs for dies, power systems and modules, and full packaging capabilities. This will achieve a first of a kind in Europe for the mass production of 200mm SiC wafers with each step of the process – substrate, epitaxy & front-end, and back-end – using 200 mm technologies for enhanced yields and performances.
The new facility is targeted to start production in 2026 and to ramp to full capacity by 2033, with up to 15,000 wafers per week at full build-out. The total investment is expected to be around five billion euros, with a support of around two billion euros provided by the State of Italy within the framework of the EU Chips Act. Sustainable practices are integral to the design, development, and operation of the Silicon Carbide Campus to ensure the responsible consumption of resources including water and power.
- New high-volume 200mm silicon carbide manufacturing facility for power devices and modules, as well as test and packaging, to be built in Catania, Italy - Projected 5 billion euros multi-year investment program including 2 billion euros support provided by the State of Italy in the framework of the EU Chips Act - Catania Silicon Carbide Campus realizes ST’s plan for fully vertically integrated SiC capabilities from R&D to manufacturing, from substrate to module, on one site, enabling automotive and industrial customers in their shift to electrification and higher energy efficiency
STMicroelectronics, a global semiconductor leader serving customers across the spectrum of electronics applications, announces a new high-volume 200mm silicon carbide (“SiC”) manufacturing facility for power devices and modules, as well as test and packaging, to be built in Catania, Italy.Combined with the SiC substrate manufacturing facility being readied on the same site,these facilities will form ST’s Silicon Carbide Campus, realizing the Company’s vision of a fully vertically integrated manufacturing facility for the mass production of SiC on one site.The creation of the new Silicon Carbide Campus is a key milestone to support customers for SiC devices across automotive, industrial and cloud infrastructure applications, as they transition to electrification and seek higher efficiency.
[...]
The Silicon Carbide Campus will serve as the center of ST’s global SiC ecosystem, integrating all steps in the production flow, including SiC substrate development, epitaxial growth processes, 200mm front-end wafer fabrication and module back-end assembly, as well as process R&D, product design, advanced R&D labs for dies, power systems and modules, and full packaging capabilities. This will achieve a first of a kind in Europe for the mass production of 200mm SiC wafers with each step of the process – substrate, epitaxy & front-end, and back-end – using 200 mm technologies for enhanced yields and performances.
The new facility is targeted to start production in 2026 and to ramp to full capacity by 2033, with up to 15,000 wafers per week at full build-out. The total investment is expected to be around five billion euros, with a support of around two billion euros provided by the State of Italy within the framework of the EU Chips Act. Sustainable practices are integral to the design, development, and operation of the Silicon Carbide Campus to ensure the responsible consumption of resources including water and power.
Surrounded by the opulent gold furnishings of the Brunei Sultan’s Istana Nurul Iman and a lavish arrangement of fresh roses, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. on Tuesday, May 28, spoke of how the Philippines and Brunei should “plan together for our own communities… but also for the peace and stability of the region.”
Marcos was in Brunei from May 28 to 29 for his first state visit to the Southeast Asian country.
During the quick visit, Marcos and Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah “exchanged views on regional and international issues of mutual interest including the importance of upholding international law, developments in Myanmar, Palestine-Israel, and the South China Sea,” according to a release from the Brunei Prime Minister’s office.
As in other trips abroad, both Marcos and his host made mention of his father, the late dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos. It was yet another flex of diplomacy, history, and personal ties that converged with Marcos Jr. as the country’s foreign policy architect.
Talk of geopolitics was also backed up by the signing of an agreement on “Maritime Cooperation.”
While a copy of the document has not been made public, Marcos himself described it as a “diplomatic agreement between Brunei and the Philippines as to the resolution of conflicts and a… bilateral mechanism for us to have that line of communication so that there is very little room for misunderstanding or a mistake or the kinds of things that can cause problems between countries.”
The signing of an agreement with Brunei comes just four months after Manila, during Marcos’ state visit to Vietnam, signed an agreement on incident prevention and management in the South China Sea with Hanoi.
That means that in the first half of 2024 alone, the Philippines has managed to forge two maritime agreements, both on preventing and managing maritime conflict, with Southeast Asian neighbors who happen to be co-claimants of features in the South China Sea.
It’s a move Marcos had announced before.
During a November 2023 visit to Hawaii, Marcos said Manila would make the effort to reach out to other claimant states as talks between China and ASEAN for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea continue without an end in sight.
“We have taken the initiative to approach those other countries around ASEAN with whom we have existing territorial conflicts, Vietnam being one of them, Malaysia being another, and to make our own code of conduct. Hopefully this will grow further and extend to other ASEAN countries,” he said during an event at the Daniel Inouye Center.
By “code of conduct,” Marcos meant bilateral agreements with Southeast Asian neighbors.
"Brunei is a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute. Regardless of its silence, coordination with the country is crucial if Manila seeks to illustrate its intentions of socializing its position with its immediate neighbors in Southeast Asia,” explained Don McLain Gill, a geopolitical analyst who teaches at the Department of International Studies of the De La Salle University in Manila.
**South China Sea claims **
In Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia claim different parts of the South China Sea, which China, meanwhile, claims in almost its entirety. Taiwan also claims most of the South China Sea, although unlike Beijing, Taipei has not resorted to aggressive actions in making its claims.
“Socializing” the Philippines’ position, explained Gill, means “[deepening] communication and diplomatic engagements” with fellow claimant Brunei “to allow it to become more familiar with Manila’s position.”
“A security [Memorandum of Understanding] is an important prerequisite for deeper talks on security issues. So it is a helpful stepping stone,” he added.
Unlike most Southeast Asian claimants in the South China Sea, Manila has been especially loud and assertive in defending both its sovereign rights and sovereignty claims.
Marcos’ rhetoric has been clear: that the Philippines, under his watch, would not give up “a single square inch of our territory.”
The policy at sea is clearer than even the waters of the West Philippine Sea: the Philippines, with its limited maritime and naval resources, is to keep constant watch over these waters.
In spite of China’s aggressive actions – “dangerous maneuvers,” blocking, and the use of water cannons against Philippine government vessels – the Philippines has remained seemingly unfazed.
“We seek no conflict with any nation, more so nations that purport and claim to be our friends but we will not be cowed into silence, submission, or subservience. Filipinos do not yield,” said Marcos in March 2024, after China blasted its strong water cannons during a Philippine mission to Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal.
Beijing’s response has been to accuse the Philippines of instigating these encounters, as well as reneging on supposed deals. That, or pinning the blame for Manila’s new-found vigor in defending its sovereign rights on supposed American influence.
Of the deals China has claimed, only one seems to be acknowledged, at least in part, by both sides – a “gentleman’s agreement” to keep the “status quo” in the South China Sea forged under former president Rodrigo Duterte.
But that deal was informal and temporary. It also meant that the Philippines would not make the most of its hard-fought win in the 2016 Arbitral Ruling, which deemed China’s sweeping South China Sea claim, among other things, invalid.
The 2016 Arbitral Ruling has been front and center of the Marcos administration’s policy in the South China Sea.
HARASSMENT. Philippine Coast Guard vessels are frequently ‘impeded and encircled’ by Chinese ships in the West Philippine Sea.
What about ASEAN?
Most prominent in the Marcos administration’s West Philippine Sea approach is its “transparency initiative,” or its effort to publicize – through official government releases and independent reports from journalists – China’s actions in the disputed waters.
Countries like the US, Japan, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and members of the European Union, among others, are almost always quick to react and side with the Philippines whenever China uses aggressive actions – short of an armed attack – in the West Philippine Sea.
Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo earlier told Rappler that the initiative has made “the rest of the world aware of the situation in the West Philippine Sea.”
“This may not have been possible to that extent without this kind of transparency because they’ve been barely aware of this. I think they see the logic and consistency of our position and they see that our position is consistent with international law,” Manalo told Rappler in late April 2024 in an interview on the World View with Marites Vitug.
More countries have joined – in varying degrees – the list of those who believe in “rules-based order” and who have also publicly affirmed their support of the 2016 Arbitral Ruling. Rising Asian powerhouse India and nearby South Korea are among the latest to begin expressing support for the Philippines under the Marcos administration.
What’s missing in the list? Southeast Asian countries – a fact that Beijing likes pointing out.
Sue Thompson, an associate professor at the Australian National University whose research has focused on Southeast Asia, told Rappler that the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN)’s seeming inability to make a unified stand on the South China Sea, for or against China, shouldn’t be surprising.
It’s not what it was made to do, after all.
“ASEAN is there to provide peace and stability in the region, but it was never meant to be a security alliance,” said Thompson in an interview in March 2024.
That’s not to say that ASEAN has remained totally silent as tensions in the South China Sea rise. Foreign ministers, in December 2023, issued a statement expressing concern over these rising tensions.
Indonesia, where the ASEAN headquarters is located, cited the 2016 Arbitral Ruling in a diplomatic note to the United Nations in May 2020.
ASEAN bloc members have taken notice of the Philippines’ novel initiative, with a few asking Manila’s embassies for briefings on the situation in the West Philippine Sea.
But there are some who’ve felt uneasy over how loud and public Manila has been in exposing China’s aggressive actions, based on conversations Rappler has had with diplomats.
It’s not that they would find it hard to believe. Other claimant countries, after all, have also been subjected to China’s incursions. But many of them have chosen to keep it on the down low, much like Manila under former president Duterte.
And while many of the claimants in the South China Sea belong to ASEAN, a bigger part of the bloc has no direct stake in the dispute. “Each individual nation-state within ASEAN will have their own relationship with China. And a lot of those relationships are based on economic ties,” Thompson said.
ASEAN is China’s largest trading partner. China is also the top trading partner of several ASEAN members, including South China Sea claimants – the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
It’s to Beijing’s advantage when incursions and confrontations are toned down. It’s why China has always preferred bilateral discussions of disputes over multilateral methods. It’s also why Beijing seethed when Manila took the issue to court in 2013, which led to the 2016 Arbitral Award.
After six years of things playing out as it wanted under Duterte, Beijing is barely coming to terms with the Marcos administration’s loud and bold strategy – to shine the spotlight on incidents China wants kept in the shadows.
Deals with Brunei, Vietnam
The Philippines and Vietnam, in the agreement from January 2024, promised to build on existing bilateral trust, confidence, and understanding through, among other things:
In a press release, the Philippines’ Presidential Communications Office said Manila and Brunei’s Maritime Cooperation deal covers “pollution, skills training, research and information sharing.” Neither country offered details on what “skills training” and “information sharing” would cover, with the Philippines noting that the understanding is “crucial for maritime nations” like Brunei and the Philippines.
Gill said the agreement helps in bringing the focus back to Manila’s efforts to bring ASEAN to the forefront of its efforts in the West Philippine Sea.
“The MoU will also illustrate that contrary to the region’s misperception, that the Philippines only wants to bring in external military powers into the region, Manila wants to deepen intra-regional maritime security cooperation with its neighbors to spearhead home grown solutions,” he said.
It’s an important move when, according to research by the UK-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, the US and China are what drive the “significant increase” of military drills in Asia from 2023 and 2022.
Marcos is set to keynote the IISS’ Shangrila Dialogues, the region’s premiere defense summit, on May 31.
Surrounded by the opulent gold furnishings of the Brunei Sultan’s Istana Nurul Iman and a lavish arrangement of fresh roses, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. on Tuesday, May 28, spoke of how the Philippines and Brunei should “plan together for our own communities… but also for the peace and stability of the region.”
Marcos was in Brunei from May 28 to 29 for his first state visit to the Southeast Asian country.
During the quick visit, Marcos and Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah “exchanged views on regional and international issues of mutual interest including the importance of upholding international law, developments in Myanmar, Palestine-Israel, and the South China Sea,” according to a release from the Brunei Prime Minister’s office.
As in other trips abroad, both Marcos and his host made mention of his father, the late dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos. It was yet another flex of diplomacy, history, and personal ties that converged with Marcos Jr. as the country’s foreign policy architect.
Talk of geopolitics was also backed up by the signing of an agreement on “Maritime Cooperation.”
While a copy of the document has not been made public, Marcos himself described it as a “diplomatic agreement between Brunei and the Philippines as to the resolution of conflicts and a… bilateral mechanism for us to have that line of communication so that there is very little room for misunderstanding or a mistake or the kinds of things that can cause problems between countries.”
The signing of an agreement with Brunei comes just four months after Manila, during Marcos’ state visit to Vietnam, signed an agreement on incident prevention and management in the South China Sea with Hanoi.
That means that in the first half of 2024 alone, the Philippines has managed to forge two maritime agreements, both on preventing and managing maritime conflict, with Southeast Asian neighbors who happen to be co-claimants of features in the South China Sea.
It’s a move Marcos had announced before.
During a November 2023 visit to Hawaii, Marcos said Manila would make the effort to reach out to other claimant states as talks between China and ASEAN for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea continue without an end in sight.
“We have taken the initiative to approach those other countries around ASEAN with whom we have existing territorial conflicts, Vietnam being one of them, Malaysia being another, and to make our own code of conduct. Hopefully this will grow further and extend to other ASEAN countries,” he said during an event at the Daniel Inouye Center.
By “code of conduct,” Marcos meant bilateral agreements with Southeast Asian neighbors.
"Brunei is a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute. Regardless of its silence, coordination with the country is crucial if Manila seeks to illustrate its intentions of socializing its position with its immediate neighbors in Southeast Asia,” explained Don McLain Gill, a geopolitical analyst who teaches at the Department of International Studies of the De La Salle University in Manila.
**South China Sea claims **
In Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia claim different parts of the South China Sea, which China, meanwhile, claims in almost its entirety. Taiwan also claims most of the South China Sea, although unlike Beijing, Taipei has not resorted to aggressive actions in making its claims.
“Socializing” the Philippines’ position, explained Gill, means “[deepening] communication and diplomatic engagements” with fellow claimant Brunei “to allow it to become more familiar with Manila’s position.”
“A security [Memorandum of Understanding] is an important prerequisite for deeper talks on security issues. So it is a helpful stepping stone,” he added.
Unlike most Southeast Asian claimants in the South China Sea, Manila has been especially loud and assertive in defending both its sovereign rights and sovereignty claims.
Marcos’ rhetoric has been clear: that the Philippines, under his watch, would not give up “a single square inch of our territory.”
The policy at sea is clearer than even the waters of the West Philippine Sea: the Philippines, with its limited maritime and naval resources, is to keep constant watch over these waters.
In spite of China’s aggressive actions – “dangerous maneuvers,” blocking, and the use of water cannons against Philippine government vessels – the Philippines has remained seemingly unfazed.
“We seek no conflict with any nation, more so nations that purport and claim to be our friends but we will not be cowed into silence, submission, or subservience. Filipinos do not yield,” said Marcos in March 2024, after China blasted its strong water cannons during a Philippine mission to Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal.
Beijing’s response has been to accuse the Philippines of instigating these encounters, as well as reneging on supposed deals. That, or pinning the blame for Manila’s new-found vigor in defending its sovereign rights on supposed American influence.
Of the deals China has claimed, only one seems to be acknowledged, at least in part, by both sides – a “gentleman’s agreement” to keep the “status quo” in the South China Sea forged under former president Rodrigo Duterte.
But that deal was informal and temporary. It also meant that the Philippines would not make the most of its hard-fought win in the 2016 Arbitral Ruling, which deemed China’s sweeping South China Sea claim, among other things, invalid.
The 2016 Arbitral Ruling has been front and center of the Marcos administration’s policy in the South China Sea.
HARASSMENT. Philippine Coast Guard vessels are frequently ‘impeded and encircled’ by Chinese ships in the West Philippine Sea.
What about ASEAN?
Most prominent in the Marcos administration’s West Philippine Sea approach is its “transparency initiative,” or its effort to publicize – through official government releases and independent reports from journalists – China’s actions in the disputed waters.
Countries like the US, Japan, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and members of the European Union, among others, are almost always quick to react and side with the Philippines whenever China uses aggressive actions – short of an armed attack – in the West Philippine Sea.
Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo earlier told Rappler that the initiative has made “the rest of the world aware of the situation in the West Philippine Sea.”
“This may not have been possible to that extent without this kind of transparency because they’ve been barely aware of this. I think they see the logic and consistency of our position and they see that our position is consistent with international law,” Manalo told Rappler in late April 2024 in an interview on the World View with Marites Vitug.
More countries have joined – in varying degrees – the list of those who believe in “rules-based order” and who have also publicly affirmed their support of the 2016 Arbitral Ruling. Rising Asian powerhouse India and nearby South Korea are among the latest to begin expressing support for the Philippines under the Marcos administration.
What’s missing in the list? Southeast Asian countries – a fact that Beijing likes pointing out.
Sue Thompson, an associate professor at the Australian National University whose research has focused on Southeast Asia, told Rappler that the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN)’s seeming inability to make a unified stand on the South China Sea, for or against China, shouldn’t be surprising.
It’s not what it was made to do, after all.
“ASEAN is there to provide peace and stability in the region, but it was never meant to be a security alliance,” said Thompson in an interview in March 2024.
That’s not to say that ASEAN has remained totally silent as tensions in the South China Sea rise. Foreign ministers, in December 2023, issued a statement expressing concern over these rising tensions.
Indonesia, where the ASEAN headquarters is located, cited the 2016 Arbitral Ruling in a diplomatic note to the United Nations in May 2020.
ASEAN bloc members have taken notice of the Philippines’ novel initiative, with a few asking Manila’s embassies for briefings on the situation in the West Philippine Sea.
But there are some who’ve felt uneasy over how loud and public Manila has been in exposing China’s aggressive actions, based on conversations Rappler has had with diplomats.
It’s not that they would find it hard to believe. Other claimant countries, after all, have also been subjected to China’s incursions. But many of them have chosen to keep it on the down low, much like Manila under former president Duterte.
And while many of the claimants in the South China Sea belong to ASEAN, a bigger part of the bloc has no direct stake in the dispute. “Each individual nation-state within ASEAN will have their own relationship with China. And a lot of those relationships are based on economic ties,” Thompson said.
ASEAN is China’s largest trading partner. China is also the top trading partner of several ASEAN members, including South China Sea claimants – the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
It’s to Beijing’s advantage when incursions and confrontations are toned down. It’s why China has always preferred bilateral discussions of disputes over multilateral methods. It’s also why Beijing seethed when Manila took the issue to court in 2013, which led to the 2016 Arbitral Award.
After six years of things playing out as it wanted under Duterte, Beijing is barely coming to terms with the Marcos administration’s loud and bold strategy – to shine the spotlight on incidents China wants kept in the shadows.
Deals with Brunei, Vietnam
The Philippines and Vietnam, in the agreement from January 2024, promised to build on existing bilateral trust, confidence, and understanding through, among other things:
In a press release, the Philippines’ Presidential Communications Office said Manila and Brunei’s Maritime Cooperation deal covers “pollution, skills training, research and information sharing.” Neither country offered details on what “skills training” and “information sharing” would cover, with the Philippines noting that the understanding is “crucial for maritime nations” like Brunei and the Philippines.
Gill said the agreement helps in bringing the focus back to Manila’s efforts to bring ASEAN to the forefront of its efforts in the West Philippine Sea.
“The MoU will also illustrate that contrary to the region’s misperception, that the Philippines only wants to bring in external military powers into the region, Manila wants to deepen intra-regional maritime security cooperation with its neighbors to spearhead home grown solutions,” he said.
It’s an important move when, according to research by the UK-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, the US and China are what drive the “significant increase” of military drills in Asia from 2023 and 2022.
Marcos is set to keynote the IISS’ Shangrila Dialogues, the region’s premiere defense summit, on May 31.
In addition to the other comments, the EU is considering to alter its decision-making process and implementing a majority vote (at the moment every single counrty must agree to a decision). That could significantly reduce the risks brought by countries like Hungary and Slovakia.
This week, the Kremlin issued a decree to halt Gazprom dividends this year. A strange move if it 'was expected to begin with', especially if we cpnsider that the Kremlin relies heavily on Gazprom to fuel its war machine.
And the alternative markets in Asia may or may not come for Russia's future, but they don't come anytime soon as Russia simply lacks the infrastructure to these destinations. According to an Analysis by the Atlantic Council, building the pipelines would cost USD 100 billion, and you can't build them overnight. That takes a very long time, time Moscow doesn't seem to have.
So call it a loss or whatever you want, but Gazprom is in big trouble, and so is the Kremlin.
What do we understand by genocide?
The Encoclopedia Britannica says:
Genocide, the deliberate and systematic destruction of a group of people because of their ethnicity, nationality, religion, or race. The term, derived from the Greek genos (“race,” “tribe,” or “nation”) and the Latin cide (“killing”) ...
Tibetan children are separated from their families at a very young age and sent to state-run boarding 'schools' where they have to complete a “compulsory education” curriculum in the Mandarin Chinese language, with no access to traditional or culturally-relevant learning.
Forced sterilization of Tibetan women.
Individuals advocating for Tibetan language and education are persecuted.
Rounding up hundreds of thousands of innocent Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other minorities in military-style reeducation camps where they are forced to work.
More can be found, for examples, in the report on 100 atrocities of CCP in Tibet (pdf)
There's is many more across the web.
Verbraucherzentrale Niedersachsen warnt vor vanea-barfussschuhe.com – Shop aus China
Dieser Onlineshop hat kein Impressum. Auf der Website findet sich zwar die Rubrik „Impressum“, jedoch verbirgt sich dahinter nur eine Rücksendeadresse. Bei einer Rücksendung kommen hohe Portokosten auf Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher zu, da diese nach Hongkong geschickt werden muss. Nur bei einem offensichtlichen Defekt wird dasselbe Produkt erneut geliefert. Es bleibt offen, wer Verantwortlicher ist und mit wem es Kundinnen und Kunden zu tun haben. Vorsicht: Shop aus China. Zur Beratung per Telefon, Video oder vor Ort.
Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas said it appeared to be part of a "broader pattern" of action by Moscow to use "tools related to the border to create fear and anxiety"
For the Chinese dissidents it could be bad, maybe also for the Hungarians in the long run. Orban risks the country's status in Nato and in the EU (if the EU blocks again the funds for Hungary as they did not long ago, it could also be harmful for Orban&friends, well, yeah ...).
Vielleicht sollte Karas mal mit seiner eigenen Partei reden?