China

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[The article has been published before the U.S. election took place. For the article's content, this is not relevant.]

In the eyes of these Chinese American election volunteers, Kamala Harris is the perfect daughter of an immigrant family. “She is a successful person who has entered mainstream society, a microcosm of the American melting pot: mixed race, a former judge, an attorney general, and finally vice-president,” one volunteer said. “Her CV is what all of us Asians want to foster in our kids, and we Chinese want our next generation to be exactly like her.”

[...]

As we observed and analyzed simplified Chinese posts on X, WeChat Channels, and Douyin (TikTok), where discussions about Harris were concentrated, we found that Harris’s immigrant status and the life experiences of her parents remain important axes that “define” her on this side of the information ecosystem. Interestingly, however, we found that the very narrative that her supporters have tried to put front and center — that she is the exemplary daughter of an immigrant family — is entirely undermined in this ecosystem'

[Still, there are a significant number of Chinese Americans who do not speak English, and who might not have access to the “Harris Briefing” or to her campaign ads. For Mandarin speakers who use simplified characters in the US, if you are an X user, there is a good chance you will access election information sites in your native language].

In the vast majority of narratives we observed, the story portrayed was precisely the opposite: Harris is a disgrace to her immigrant family owing to her failure to excel, and to her alleged indiscretions in her private life. At the same time, the question of Harris’s femininity adds a further layer of complexity to these discussions. What does it mean to be the good daughter of immigrants? What makes a good politician? What makes a good woman?

[...]

**In this world [of Mandarin-speaking Chinese social media], Harris is known by another name — wu ji (烏雞), or “the black chicken” Meanwhile, her running mate, Minnesota Governor Tim Waltz, is called “Bai Feng,” or “white phoenix.” **Taken together, the first characters in these nicknames, “Wu” and “Bai,” allude to the fact the candidates are darker and lighter-skinned. Together, the two names also come very close to “Wuji Baifeng Wan,” the name of a proprietary Chinese medicine that claims to be “an all-purpose gynecological treatment.” To a certain extent, this coincides with Trump and his supporters calling Walz a “tampon man,” emphasizing the femininity of the Harris-Walz duo, while at the same time drawing the reader’s imagination to the female body and sexual organs. **The word “ji” (雞), the second character in this name for Harris, is even more obscene, directly linking it to the Chinese words for “chicken” and its homophone “prostitute” (妓). **

[...]

When it comes to specifics about Harris, Chinese-language posts tend to be very sparse in terms of real information content. A portion of the posts are simply re-posts of opinion pieces, screenshots, cartoons, and other content from English-language accounts, while the Chinese comments added are at once implicit and quite explicit. They are obscure in the sense that any observer unfamiliar with labels like “the black chicken” (烏雞), “goose giblets” (鵝雜), “Harry crap” (哈里屎), “tampon man” (棉條男), “white duck” (白鴨), “yellow left” (黃左), “mackerel” (​​鮁魚), and “fox” (狐狸), will imagine these are just some form of local dialect, or a secret code.

These words are extremely derogatory to both Harris and Walz. The term “goose giblets,” for example, is a derivation of the slang term “giblets” (杂碎), which can suggest someone is trash. Its pronunciation in Chinese somewhat resembles “Walz,” and so in this case it is used to insult the Democrats’ candidate for vice president. The term “yellow left,” derived from the term “white left” (not unlike the insult “liberal snowflake”), is an insult directed online at Chinese liberals.

[...]

Get past these odd words, though, and the messages inside these posts are the most basic and direct insults, ridicule and propaganda. A few are slightly more measured, like, “to reduce taxes and raise revenues, elect Trump; to increase taxes and get poorer, elect the cockerel.” But many are unmistakable personal and racist attacks: “If Columbus hadn’t discovered the New World, then there wouldn’t be a black chicken like her! Her father would have inherited his ancestral property and kept slaves in Jamaica, and her mother would have self-immolated and died for her husband.”

[...]

[For example], the WeChat channel “Country Road America” focuses on American politics. [...] Quite a number of these posts are about Harris as a woman. Several, posted under the name “Amber Kite” (琥珀風箏), go on and on with stories alleging Harris has used sex for career advancement:

>“When she was just in her 20s she became the mistress of a 60 year old married man (my dad isn’t even 31 years older than me, by the way) as she was looking for the first pot of money in politics from a California establishment figure who was a married man a generation older — it’s just amazing that almost half of Americans tout her as a ‘feminist icon.’” — The Democrats are about to be devoured! The leaders have hand-picked themselves. A descendants of a master poses as a member of the slave class, and a mistress represents women’s rights.

>[...]

>“Brown himself admitted that he had helped Harris get two high-paying jobs in the California state government, and that she made hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue in a few years, and that was 30 years ago. She had no background in the field, and Brown gave her a fancy car, the California version of the BMW.” — The First Bucket of Money for Harris, California’s BMW Woman. [NOTE: “BMW Woman” was a contestant on a Chinese dating show a decade ago, who famously said: “I’d rather cry in a BMW than laugh on the back of a bicycle.” She became a symbol of frivolity.]

[...]

[The article cites many similar examples.]

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Several videos shared online by Foxconn workers in Zhengzhou, Henan province, depict workers fainting due to long hours of overtime work in October. Given the demanding schedules, workers asked,

On 8 October, a video on Douyin described a female worker being taken to the hospital after days of night work. Three days later, another video (which has since been removed) reported that two workers fainted in the F area of the Foxconn facility. Additionally, a video uploaded on 12 October (also removed) reported another incident of a worker fainting in a workshop. China Labour Bulletin was unable to verify whether these reported cases overlapped.

Foxconn factories in Henan have significantly extended working hours following the release of the new iPhone models, leading many workers to believe this contributed to recent fainting incidents.

[...]

Similar arrangements for longer working hours were also reported at Foxconn factories in Shenzhen, although no fainting incidents have been reported.

Archived link

As China continues to grapple with a shrinking population, new data from the Ministry of Civil Affairs reveals a significant decline in marriage registrations for the first nine months of 2024. Only 4.747 million couples registered their marriages nationwide during this period, marking a year-on-year decrease of 943,000 couples. These figures, highlighted in a Reuters analysis of official data, underscore the ongoing challenge the country faces in encouraging young people to marry and start families.

This trend is a setback for Chinese lawmakers who have been working to counteract the country’s population decline through policy interventions and cultural campaigns.

[...]

The drop in marriage registrations in 2024 follows an earlier increase observed in 2023, when 5.690 million couples registered to marry during the first nine months of the year. This year’s decrease signals a return to the downward trend China has experienced over the past decade. As marriage rates decline, so too do birth rates—a significant concern for a country with a rapidly aging population. Government data showed China’s birth rate dropped for a second consecutive year in 2023, prompting officials to launch initiatives to boost marriage and birth rates in major cities.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has emphasized the importance of reversing this trend. Recently, he called on Chinese women to play a “critical role” in family building, urging them to establish a “new trend of family” that aligns with the country’s demographic goals. His remarks reflect a broader government effort to revive traditional family structures while fostering a “new-era” culture that celebrates marriage and childbearing.

China’s economic climate is a primary driver behind the decline in marriage registrations. Many young adults are struggling to secure stable employment and affordable housing, which has caused them to delay or forego marriage altogether. Urban centers, particularly megacities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, have seen a significant rise in the cost of living, further deterring young couples from committing to long-term partnerships and family planning. The price of housing, healthcare, and education has soared, forcing many young adults to prioritize financial security over starting families.

[...]

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Chinese state-affiliated accounts bypass transparency efforts on social media by using cloaked accounts or brands, masking their connections to China’s government bodies. These accounts, which interact on social media platforms as though they were independent entities, are sometimes capable of reaching millions, and even pay to amplify their messages.

Examples of such accounts are legion. “Hi, this is GBA” looks like just a social media influencer on X with more than 85,000 followers, as does “Daily Bae,” which has 1.1 million followers on Facebook. Both are external propaganda brands run by Guangdong province, and clearly identified as such in official media reports.

As [China's president] Xi Jinping speaks of “building a more effective international communication system,” part of the message he conveyed this week during a collective study session of the Politburo, accounts like these, run not just by state media but by provincial and city-level international communication centers (ICCs), are a critical part of the strategy.

[...]

The account “China Says” looks unassuming enough. It has a blue check and nearly 190,000 followers on X. On Facebook, it has 3.9 million followers, and its posts sometimes get millions of views. The bio section for “China Says” on X claims that the account offers “exclusive insights” into China’s foreign policy. At times, these insights appear as paid ads in X feeds like yours and mine. Much of the content on “China Says” focuses on the innocent promotion of local cuisine. But at times the account takes a sharp turn into the political. It regularly hosts explainers, for example, on China’s view of the international political system.

[...]

In fact, “China Says” is operated by the Chinese Internet News Center (中国互联网新闻中心), an institution directly under China’s State Council Information Office (SCIO). The SCIO is essentially the same office as the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Propaganda Department — which means that this “news and media website,” as it is labeled on Facebook, is speaking from the very center of the Chinese party-state. And yet, quite unlike the account for China Daily, also under the SCIO, the account bears no “China state-controlled media” label.

[...]

“China Says” is one cloaked party-state account on X that has made good use of the platform’s marketing system. X Ads offer any account paid promotion for their content over a fixed period of time, allowing posts to maximize exposure — acquiring followers and engagement more quickly. The tool also allows campaigns to target audiences, according to which country they are in and if they have followed certain Twitter accounts.

[...]

The list of those to target also includes anyone following a long list of Chinese X accounts, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the People’s Daily, CGTN, China Daily, The Paper — and even Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post, which in 2015 was bought by Alibaba Group.

[...]

China Says is also a concrete case study on what Xi Jinping meant when he spoke about the "pattern reconstruction of international communication," and about "innovative online external propaganda."

[...]

Be ready for stunning views of stony Tibetan peaks, followed by soft and playful pandas, and then a serving of anti-Western propaganda. It could come at you from anywhere.

Archived link

He Zongying, a female technician employed at a FinDreams Battery factory in Wuhan, a subsidiary of Chinese EV giant BYD, suffered verbal abuse and threats from a male colleague. She immediately reported the issue to the company and also contacted the police. But, to her surprise, the company initially refused to hand over the surveillance footage of the incident to authorities, provided her with no clear path to file a complaint, and then chose to fire her rather than pursue her claim.

Meanwhile, the official union tasked with protecting her rights remained silent. Thus, despite the company’s stated commitment to corporate responsibility, its mechanisms for resolving claims of harassment proved not only ineffective but even resulted in the victim being punished by the company for raising the issue in the first place.

[...]

[Later on], she was called into a meeting with two male colleagues from the factory and a female staff member from Human Resources. But, instead of addressing her complaint, the meeting resulted in He being written up for two violations of company policy. To add insult to injury, one of these violations even stated that she had humiliated and verbally abused the man who had harassed her. She expressed her confusion, pointing out that the incident was on tape and asking why her attempt to stop his harassment was now being characterised as “humiliation and abuse.” In response, her supervisor merely stated that she could have handled the situation differently.

[...]

The second penalty He Zongying received was for exhibiting “improper conduct” and engaging in “repeated misbehaviour within a three-month period.” In addition to the initial altercation, this penalty also involved He allegedly leaving her workstation without authorisation on other occasions.

[...]

Over the following week or so, she was instructed to await further notice and was told that she needed not come into work. When she was finally instructed to return, however, she found that she had been removed from all technical tasks and instead given janitorial duties. Meanwhile, all the days she had been forced to take off by the company had been deducted from her salary.

[...]

BYD Contradicts its own Corporate Responsibility Policies, Union Offers No Support

In its labour rights protection policy, FinDreams Battery states that employees are valuable assets and offers various channels through which employees can provide feedback. The company’s 2023 “Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance Report” even outlines specific complaint mechanisms and mental health support services offered to workers. The parent firm BYD has also stated in its own corporate responsibility statements that it “firmly opposes workplace violence and harassment.”

[...]

[Edit typo.]

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One of China’s biggest challenges today is its unprecedented low birth rate that threatens its economic development, especially given the country’s unsustainable pension system that is expected to be financially unviable by 2035. Besides this, the system shows wide discrepancies between northern and southern Chinese regions, which stems from their different economic development models. And while Chinese authorities continue to adopt and implement multiple policies aimed at boosting marriage and birth rates, Chinese citizens are increasingly disengaging from the party-state.

**A Propaganda Machine Stuck in the Past **

By all standards, China is a surveillance state that uses social credit, face recognition AI and other means to control its own population. From 1980 to 2015, Beijing successfully imposed its infamous One-Child Policy that led to effective population control. [...] Indeed, the combination of strict birth control and economic opening-up did lead to a dramatic improvement in living standards.

At the same time, Beijing showed that it would stop at nothing to enforce its coercive measures that included hefty fines in rural areas, forced abortions at late stages, and even forced sterilization. The One-Child Policy also resulted in an alarming gender gap, with over 30 million women gone missing, which has led to large-scale trafficking from other Asian countries.

Today, the challenge is the opposite of the situation in the early 1980s: China needs more children. China’s birth rate hit its lowest in 2023, with 6.2 children per 1,000 inhabitants, nearing the figures in Japan and South Korea.

[...]

Faced with a record low birth rate, Beijing finds itself caught in its own narrative. As suggested by [the state-controlled media outlet] Global Times article: “China regards the people’s right to subsistence and development as its top priority.” However, the Chinese people are long past the level of ‘subsistence’ this refers to, and the people are now seeking security amid a crumbling system. And while it is too early to talk about a ‘parallel’ society that exists outside the system in China, the society’s refusal to comply with state policies that are essential to the party’s survival is already an indication of a larger crack in the system.

• Chinese citizens' seemingly popular attitudes toward their government as party propaganda gained in direct surveys -and covered by China Central Television, Xinhua, China Global Television Network, China Dailyand other state-controlled outlets- provide a false narrative as survey respondents conceal their opposition to the regime due to the threat of repression.
• Deeper analyses find that Chinese citizens are far more fearful of expressing opposition to the regime under its leader Xi Jinping than in other autocracies, suggesting that observers should be sceptical about public opinion surveys in China that rely on direct questioning.
• The [Chinese Communist Party] CCP’s sprawling internal security apparatus compels citizens to engage in widespread self-censorship, at a rate nearly three times higher than in Vladamir Putin’s Russia.
• Researcher say the CCP confronts widespread frustration. Its recent policies, including the increase in repression and sabre-rattling over Taiwan, should be seen as an effort to contain this frustration.

[Edit typo.]

[Recently] more than 80 scholars and officials attended a grand ceremony in China to drive home the simple point that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The event centered on a new book by Taiwanese author Fan Wenyi whose title read like a brawling challenge — Who Says Taiwan is Not Part of China? (谁说台湾不是中国的). According to state media coverage, Fan’s book, which makes the case for reunification, will have “a positive significance in enhancing mutual understanding and trust between compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.”

But a deeper dive behind the headlines pushing this supposedly inspirational book turns up more questions than answers.

The Beijing event, splashed across a number of official media outlets, including the central government’s China Daily and the website of its Taiwan Affairs Office, is in fact a typical case study in how China rolls out propaganda campaigns through a combination of party-state linked activities and state-backed media publicity. Organizations and individuals, like “Taiwanese author Fan Wenyi,” are trotted out as personal and intellectual actors, emerging with their own voices from Chinese civil society. A closer look and these staged events unravel, revealing the party-state actors and agendas just behind.

While [China state-] media coverage presents “Professor Fan Wenyi” as a known scholar born in the city of Hualien in eastern Taiwan, virtually no information is available about the man [...]

Aside from a smattering of official media mentions prior to this book launch [...] Fan Wenyi seems to be a nobody. Last week’s coverage explains that Fan’s mother was an active member of literary societies during the Japanese colonial era in Taiwan, and that she instilled in him a sense of his fundamental Chineseness.

But the scholarship of this “research scholar” is nowhere to be found. Nor is it clear where he was ever a professor. And yet, audiences are meant to be moved by his authoritative declaration: “I am Taiwanese, and I am also Chinese.”

On the question of audience, the even odder fact is that Fan’s book, launched with so much fanfare within a week of Taiwan’s national day holiday (which a stage version taller than a human being), is apparently available nowhere. For starters, bookstores and suppliers in Taiwan, including the well-known Eslite, do not carry the book at all. Even on Douban (豆瓣), China’s popular domestic online book supplier, there is no whiff of Fan’s work. The only online source — oddly for a book meant to “enhance mutual understanding” on both sides of the Taiwan Straits — appears to be Amazon Singapore, where the book is “currently unavailable.”

[...]

A heavy police response has stifled Halloween celebrations in Shanghai, in what many have viewed as an attempt by authorities to crack down on large public gatherings and freedom of expression.

Witnesses [said they] saw police dispersing crowds of costumed revellers on the streets of Shanghai, while photos of apparent arrests have spread on social media.

Authorities have yet to comment. While there has been no official notice prohibiting Halloween celebrations, rumours of a possible crackdown began circulating online earlier this month.

It comes a year after Halloween revellers in Shanghai went viral for donning costumes poking fun at the Chinese government and its policies.

Pictures from last year's Halloween event showed people dressing up as a giant surveillance camera, Covid testers, and a censored Weibo post.

[...]

On Friday a large number of police officers and vehicles gathered on Julu Road in downtown Shanghai, and people dressed in costumes were asked to leave the scene.

On Saturday, police were seen dispersing revellers from the city's Zhongshan Park.

[...]

[One] Shanghai resident said the number of police officers taking down the details of people dressed in costumes appeared to exceed the number of revellers themselves.

[...]

Rumours of a crackdown have been circulating in recent days.

Earlier this month, some business owners who run coffeeshops, bookshops and bars in Shanghai received government notices discouraging Halloween events.

Around the same time, messages from what appeared to be a government work chat group spread online, suggesting there would be a ban on large-scale Halloween activities.

[...]

One student at the prestigious Fudan University said they were told by school authorities recently not to participate in gatherings. On Sunday evening, the student received a call from a school counsellor.

"They called me to ask if I had gone out, if I had taken part [in activities]. And if I did participate, I could not reveal I was a student [of the university]," the person said;

[...]

In November 2022 [a] large groups of people, mostly youths, gathered spontaneously one night on a street in Shanghai to mourn the victims of a fire.

That gathering soon turned into brief - but widespread - demonstrations against the country's Covid policies, in one of the biggest challenges to the Chinese government's authority since the Tiananmen protests.

Historically, China’s government influenced family planning, enforcing the one-child policy. This policy involved harsh fines and forced abortions. Today, the focus has shifted, encouraging families to have more children. As China faces an aging population, the government sees this as an economic necessity.

Officials have begun knocking on doors, asking women about their family planning intentions. Many report being questioned about personal details. These questions reflect the shift from limiting families to promoting larger ones.

[...]

The government is collaborating with universities to promote marriage and childbirth. Leaders also stress this message at political gatherings, urging women to have children. This push makes it harder for women to ignore state pressure.

In many cases, officials visit homes to track women’s progress after childbirth. Some are even asked to pose for photographs with their babies for official records. These actions make many women uncomfortable, crossing into personal boundaries.

[...]

Many women feel these efforts are disconnected from reality. The cost of raising children is high in urban China, making large families unrealistic for most. Career demands and personal goals further complicate the decision to have children.

[...]

China is not only trying to increase birth rates. The government also wants to change the culture around family. They promote a “new marriage and childbearing culture.” Once tasked with limiting births, family planning associations are now encouraging families to grow.

Health and Government Surveillance

For many women, government involvement begins even before marriage. Officials often monitor couples’ plans after free health screenings. During these appointments, women receive advice on when to have children. Many women later receive calls encouraging them to pick up free prenatal supplements.

This monitoring doesn’t end with marriage. Government websites advise pregnant women to register at community health centers, which are run by local officials and keep track of pregnancies. Some women appreciate the support, but others find it intrusive. The constant check-ins feel like surveillance rather than care.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4157529

James Robinson, along with Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, has been awarded this year’s Nobel Prize in Economics for his research on the critical role institutions play in fostering national prosperity. In [this Q&A session]l with EL PAÍS, he explains that his work also seeks to highlight how the legacy of colonialism has impeded economic development in certain regions, particularly in Latin America and Africa.

James Robinson: [...] we make a simple division, focusing on the presence of inclusive institutions or extractive institutions. Inclusive institutions create broad incentives and opportunities for all people equally, while extractive institutions concentrate benefits and incentives in the hands of a few. Many economists say that development comes from entrepreneurship and innovation, but in reality it comes from people’s dreams, creativity and aspirations. To be prosperous, you have to create a series of institutions that can cultivate this talent. However, if you look at countries like Colombia or Nigeria, talent is wasted because people do not have opportunities.

[...]

Institutions can be an obstacle to competitiveness. However, one should consider the impact that European integration had on countries such as Spain, Portugal or the former Soviet countries. These are remarkable success stories. There has been an almost unprecedented transition. It is true that there may be too much regulation or inefficient rules, but broadly speaking the effects of European institutions has been largely positive over the past 50 years.

[...]

[Immigration] is one of the big questions we have to solve. [...] it can be difficult. It is not easy to quickly incorporate the millions of people who cross the Mediterranean [trying to reach Europe]. One of the possible ways is to help them develop in order to improve the terrible situation in their own countries. However, one of the biggest complications is that the policies recommended by Western institutions are not in tune with what is happening in these [developing] countries. At the World Bank, for example, you cannot talk about politics. How do we expect them to solve real problems when you cannot talk about them? Frankly, it doesn’t make sense. If we really want to change the world, we have to have honest conversations. I see that as a long way off.

[...]

The reality is that democratic countries have shown that they are better at managing public services and achieving rapid growth. You can find impressive examples like China among autocratic countries, but you cannot achieve an inclusive economy with an authoritarian regime and a model like the Chinese one.

[...]

I don’t think the Chinese model can continue. If you look at other authoritarian regimes, like Iran or Russia, they are incredibly weak economically and technologically. The economy cannot flourish in an authoritarian regime. Right now, technological dynamism is concentrated in one such country and in the Western world. However, one has to consider that, with Donald Trump, the institutions that have made the United States great are being seriously questioned. This could affect the context, and that is why the European Union and NATO are so important.

[...]

[Populism is linked to the growing disconnect between governments and citizens] and an example of this is Latin America. Democracy promised too much and did not always deliver. People’s lives did not change, and they sought new alternatives. There are various factors why democracy has not achieved transformations, such as clientelism and corruption. [...] Venezuela was governed in a deeply corrupt manner, and Hugo Chávez was clever in taking advantage of it. You also see this with Donald Trump, who has gone far because he realized there was widespread dissatisfaction with traditional politics. The failures of democratic institutions are real, and that is why we have to think about how to make them more empathetic to what people need.

[...]

Artificial intelligence can be wonderful, but like all technologies, it depends on how it is used. If artificial intelligence is used to create replacements for humans, that could be devastating. [...] It is all about how it is used, and that depends on our governments. I think that these decisions should not be left to the tech gurus. They only think about what makes them the most money, even if this is not related to the general well-being of society. In the case of artificial intelligence, it is very important, because it could have a tectonic impact on the world.

[...]

Amidst increasing pushback on [China’s] widespread and systematic human rights abuse in its prison and detention system that led the European Court of Human Rights to bar extraditions to the country on grounds of the existence of a “general situation of violence”, Chinese authorities are not relenting in their quest to obtain the forced return of individuals in plain violation of the ius cogens principle of non-refoulement.

[...]

[in one case, Chinese] authorities knowingly lied to INTERPOL when filing their international request. As official documents submitted to Thai courts in support of the extradition request demonstrate, the real date of the Chinese arrest warrant does not correspond to the one declared to INTERPOL.

[...]

It begs the question: when will actual consequences be imposed on this repeat offender?

We call on INTERPOL’s General Secretariat to utilize its powers under [established] rules and evaluate China’s use of Red Notices, Diffusions, and other INTERPOL mechanisms after a string of abuse has been uncovered spanning several years.

Original article is behind a paywall.

Recently, as Chinese authorities have strengthened overall social control, oppression of academia has reportedly become more severe. Not only are scholars expelled, but there are even cases of disappearance.

According to the FT, Huwei, Communist Party's Shanghai City Party professor, was forced to retire early after criticizing Russia's full-scale invasion most prominently.

[He] sparked a fierce debate within China shortly after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, arguing that China should cut ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin as soon as possible. This was contrary to President Xi Jinping's policy of trying to get close to President Putin.

[...]

China is targeting intellectuals living not only at home but also abroad, suppressing traditionally sensitive topics such as politics as well as discussions about China's economy, which has recently been in big trouble, the FT noted.

Some scholars were detained on unknown charges and suddenly disappeared one day, and some were fired from universities or affiliated organizations. In some cases, social media accounts were canceled or other forms of administrative or legal punishment were given.

Specifically, Zhu Hengfeng (朱恒鵬), former vice president of the Economic Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences, was detained for posting on WeChat (微 Trust, Chinese version of Kakao Talk). Chinese media recently reported that former Vice President Zhu was recently severely punished for "absurd remarks to the party's center."

The FT also mentioned the case that Dr. Wu Chang (吳强), who worked as a political science lecturer at Tsinghua University, was placed under house arrest during both sessions (the National People's Congress and the National People's Political Consultative Conference) in March this year. Neither the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences nor Tsinghua University responded to the FT's request for comment.

In recent years, Chinese scholars working in Japan are known to be particularly targeted. 范 濤, a political science professor at Japan's Asian University, disappeared last year on his way back to his hometown of Shanghai. Professor 胡 of Kobe Gakuin University, Japan, also went missing during a trip to China last year.

[...]

Renowned Uyghur folklorist Rahile Daute disappeared in 2017, and it was reported in September last year that he was sentenced to life in prison through a secret trial.

"During former President Mao Zedong's rule, China strictly controlled professors' working conditions and children's schools," said Perry Link, a professor at Princeton University.

[...]

According to China's National Bureau of Statistics on the 21st, the unemployment rate of young people (16-24 years old) reached 18.8% in August. It's the highest it's been this year. This is attributed to the fact that a large number of students who graduated from school in the first half of this year jumped into the job front.

[...]

Chinese authorities temporarily suspended the release of monthly figures after youth unemployment hit an all-time high of 21.3% in June last year. Since then, new standards have been applied and announced from this year excluding enrolled students from the statistical target. Nevertheless, the youth unemployment rate, which was 14.6% in January this year, is steadily rising.

Last month, the story of 24-year-old Lee became a hot topic on Weibo, a Chinese social network service (SNS). After completing a master's degree in physics at the graduate school, it was known that he got a job as a cleaner at a high school in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province.

[...]

In fact, many young Chinese people are flocking to gig workers (short-time workers). The number of delivery drivers registered on Meituan, a large delivery platform, jumped from 3.98 million in 2019 to 7.45 million last year. The growth of the delivery market slowed due to the end of the "COVID-19 lockdown" policy, but the number of delivery drivers increased.

[...]

Against this backdrop, the Chinese government has recently decided to strengthen its crackdown on slang and newly coined words on the Internet. Some analysts say that they intend to censor terms that criticize the Chinese Communist Party and the government.

Archived link

The sudden order to remove the symbol of the cross from the roof and entrance of a village church in China’s Anhui province cited unspecified “safety” hazards.

The notice, issued in March, was a shock to the church in Yongqing, eastern China, which had reportedly passed official safety inspections for the cross on the roof five years ago. The second cross had stood at the door of the church for over 40 years without any security concerns.

[...]

Nicola Smith Asia Correspondent. Jenny Pan Related Topics

Xi Jinping, China, Christianity, Religion 

05 October 2024 2:00pm BST 98

Worshippers in a Roman Catholic church in China Worshippers in a Roman Catholic church in China Sally and Richard Greenhill/Alamy Stock Photo

The sudden order to remove the symbol of the cross from the roof and entrance of a village church in China’s Anhui province cited unspecified “safety” hazards.

The notice, issued in March, was a shock to the church in Yongqing, eastern China, which had reportedly passed official safety inspections for the cross on the roof five years ago. The second cross had stood at the door of the church for over 40 years without any security concerns.

ChinaAid, a US-based group that advocates for religious freedom in China, alleged the order had been made by the villagers’ committee with no legal basis, suggesting it may have originated with higher-level authorities who wanted to avoid international criticism. Party slogans and censorship

It was one of multiple examples of oppression cited in a report last week by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), an agency that reviews violations of religious freedoms overseas and makes policy recommendations to the President and Congress.

In their effort to “exert total control” over religion and to “sinicise” Catholic and Protestant Christianity, the authorities have “ordered the removal of crosses from churches [and] replaced images of Jesus Christ or the Virgin Mary with pictures of President Xi Jinping,” the report said.

The Chinese government has also required “the display of CCP [Chinese Communist Party] slogans at the entrances of churches, censored religious texts, imposed CCP-approved religious materials, and instructed clergy to preach CCP ideology,” the USCIRF report said.

Its investigation pointed to a report from 2019 of a Catholic church in the eastern province of Jiangxi that was forced to replace a painting of the Virgin Mary with her child with one of President Xi.

[...]

Chinese authorities have forcibly detained four Tibetan students, aged 15 to 18, for refusing to attend a state-run boarding school following the closure of the Buddhist primary school at Taktsang Lhamo Kirti Monastery in Dzoge County, according to a report by Radio Free Asia. The students have been subjected to “political education” as part of the government’s efforts to enforce attendance at state-run institutions.

The Taktsang Lhamo Kirti Monastery School was shut down on October 1, coinciding with China’s National Day celebrations. On October 2, authorities forced more than 200 students, aged 15 to 18, to attend state-run schools in Dzoge County as part of China’s compulsory education policy, marking the complete closure of the monastery school. Starting in July, over 300 younger students, aged 6 to 14, had already been forcibly transferred to various state-run schools in the county.

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The forcibly enrolled young monks are being educated primarily through Chinese textbooks. However, they are also receiving separate political education sessions focused on Chinese politics and ‘Xi Jinping’s Thought,’ according to an anonymous source inside Tibet.

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While censorship on economic issues is hardly new, the level of repression has taken a darker turn of late, sending chills through anyone in the country who analyzes the economy as part of their profession.

The most extreme example is the reported disappearance of Zhu Hengpeng, one of China’s most prominent and well-connected economists. Zhu is a director at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), a leading think tank that reports directly to the cabinet.

[...]

He is believed to have been forcibly disappeared in April after he made disparaging remarks about the economy in a private chat group on the Chinese social media platform WeChat. The specifics of what Zhu said are unclear, but some reports indicate that he had “improperly discussed central policies” and made a reference to the “mortality” of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping.

[...]

While economic information is perceived as being less politically sensitive than discussions about democracy or human rights in China, [...] research shows that over the past decade, the CCP has repeatedly ratcheted up restrictions whenever the economy appears to be in trouble. This year, the crackdown has increasingly focused on content that addresses income inequality, youth employment, and poverty – in other words, deep-rooted problems that affect large swaths of the population and could undermine a key pillar of the CCP’s political legitimacy.

[...]

Chinese citizens are also prohibited from expressing their feelings about the economy. In February, WeChat removed a popular article that reported on survey findings from the Guangzhou-based Canton Public Opinion Research Center, which revealed a prevailing sense of pessimism about the country’s economic well-being. Around the same time, the CCP’s flagship mouthpiece People’s Daily published an article titled “The Whole Country Is Filled with Optimism,” attempting to project positivity online. Netizens immediately flooded the social media platform Weibo with posts ridiculing the article. Within hours, the hashtag being used to discuss the piece was removed from public view.

[...] information on the economy is a daily concern for almost everyone in China. Tight censorship on this topic can breed mass distrust in approved sources and compel more netizens to circumvent the CCP’s draconian internet censorship, despite the possibility of punishment, in search of more objective news and analysis on China’s economic situation. In other words, censorship on the economy could ultimately backfire on censorship in general, exposing the regime to an even greater crisis of legitimacy.

For years, posts related to events during World War Two have proliferated on the Chinese internet, with the Japanese invasion during the war remaining a sensitive topic for nationalists on both sides. In China, Japan’s wartime atrocities have long been a sore point as Beijing maintains that Tokyo has never fully apologised.

The online posts are part of a wider phenomenon, which encompasses both xenophobia and attacks on Chinese nationals for being unpatriotic. One argument by analysts is that this digital nationalism has gone mostly unchecked by the Chinese government, with online patriotism fanning flames of anti-foreigner sentiment as well as accusations against Chinese figures.

Some are asking if this has gone too far. [...]They see echoes of the violent, state-sponsored campaign against so-called enemies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that traumatised the country in the 1960 and 1970s. Hundreds of thousands died in purges often led by youth militias known as the Red Guards. Families and neighbours turned on each other.

In a recent essay, author and university professor Zhang Sheng noted that “in the past people summoned the Red Guards, now people summon the ‘little pinks’” – a popular nickname for the virtual army of online nationalists.

[...]

It is not just foreigners facing the ire of cyber-nationalists. In recent months, Chinese public figures and companies have also been castigated for being insufficiently patriotic.

Beverage giant Nongfu Spring is considered a Chinese business success story, with its mineral water bottles a ubiquitous sight across the country’s convenience stores and restaurant tables. But in March, nationalists accused the company of using Japanese elements in its product design. One of its logos was said to resemble a Shinto temple, while the iconic mineral water bottle’s red cap was deemed to be a reference to the Japanese flag.

It resulted in a brief but intense online campaign: some called for a boycott, while videos of people angrily stamping on Nongfu Spring bottles and chucking their drinks down the toilet were all over social media.

Similarly, the author and Nobel Literature Prize laureate Mo Yan was accused of “beautifying” Japanese soldiers and being unpatriotic in his works by a nationalist blogger, who controversially sued the writer for insulting China.

[...]

Even state media has accused online nationalists of “making patriotism a business”. One commentary by CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily said those who “stir up public opinion and add fuel to the flames in order to… gain traffic and make personal gains, should be severely punished”.

But the ruling party has had a hand in stoking the fire, some say.

Chinese police have detained four workers of the Taiwanese iPhone maker, Foxconn, in circumstances Taipei has described as "strange".

The employees were arrested in Zhengzhou in Henan province on "breach of trust" charges, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council said in a statement.

[...]

Taiwanese authorities suggested the detentions may be a case of "abuse of power" by Chinese police officers.

And said the case undermines the confidence of businesses operating in China.

In October last year, China's tax and land authorities launched an investigation into the company.

At that time, Foxconn's founder Terry Gou was running as an independent candidate in Taiwan's presidential election.

Taiwan has urged its citizens to "avoid non-essential travel" to the mainland as well as Hong Kong and Macau after China unveiled guidelines in June detailing criminal punishments for what Beijing described as diehard "Taiwan independence" separatists.

[...]

In September, China announced that it was putting a stop to international adoptions, including cases where families were already matched with adoptee children.

The painful wait will particularly determine the fates of China’s most vulnerable children - those with special needs.

Up-to-date statistics are not readily available, but Beijing’s civil affairs ministry said that 95% of international adoptions between 2014 and 2018 involved children with disabilities.

These children “will have no future” without international adoption as they are unlikely to be adopted domestically, says Huang Yanzhong, a senior fellow at the US-based Council on Foreign Relations.

Beijing has not commented since the September announcement. It said the ban was in line with international agreements and showed China’s “overall development and progress”.

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The [Chinese economic] model that has powered four decades of breakneck economic growth was reliant on cheap exports and wasteful state-led investment in property and infrastructure. It is no longer sustainable. It has led to soaring debt and diminishing returns, with China littered with ghost cities, containing 60 to 100 million empty or incomplete homes, while companies accounting for 40% of China’s home sales have defaulted. It is widely agreed that China needs to rebalance its economy, that consumers need to spend more, since private consumption accounts for just 39% of the economy – extremely low by world standards (the figure in the US is 68%). But there is no consumer confidence, with 80% of family wealth tied up in property and no meaningful social safety net.

China's leader Xi Jinping hopes renewable energy tech can replace property as a new motor of growth, and mouth-watering subsidies have been thrown at industries ranging from solar panels to electric vehicles (EVs) and batteries, leading to massive over-capacity and vicious price wars. Yet the benign global environment that accompanied China’s earlier export splurges has gone; the world is much more wary, and both the US and EU have imposed hefty tariffs on Chinese EVs and solar panels they allege are being dumped at below cost.

[,,,]

China has never provided a level playing field for foreign business, but under Xi, the environment has become increasingly hostile. Last year, direct foreign investment into China fell to a 23-year-low. In Western boardrooms, once so bewitched with capturing a share of the mythical China market that they would put normally rational decision-making aside and suffer almost any indignity, ‘resilience’ has become the watchword. The Ukraine war has exposed the danger of over dependence on autocrats with hostile ambitions.

[...]

Chinese authorities are seeking to intimidate people from China living in Japan who take part in activities critical of the Chinese government, Human Rights Watch said today.

The Chinese government’s harassment of people from China, including those from Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia, and their family members back home, appears aimed at deterring members of the diaspora from protesting against the government or engaging in events deemed politically sensitive. The Chinese authorities have also sought out diaspora members to provide information on others in Japan.

“Chinese authorities appear to have few scruples about silencing people from China living in Japan who criticize Beijing’s abuses,” said Teppei Kasai, Asia program officer at Human Rights Watch. “The Japanese government should make clear to Beijing it won’t tolerate the long arm of China’s transnational repression in Japan.”

[...]

Most of those interviewed said that the Chinese police have contacted them or their relatives back home, pressuring them to end their activities in Japan. Several provided logs of messages from the Chinese social media platform WeChat, recordings of video calls, and CCTV footage that corroborated their accounts.

One person said they stopped participating in any politically sensitive in-person and online activities after receiving a call from Chinese authorities in 2024. Another who initially agreed to be interviewed later decided not to participate out of fear that Chinese authorities would retaliate.

[...]

A brief exemplified summary:

• Several ethnic Uyghurs from Xinjiang said that Chinese authorities contacted them through their relatives back home.
• Several people from Inner Mongolia involved in promoting language rights and peaceful self-determination for Inner Mongolians, an ethnic minority, said that Chinese authorities had contacted them, often through their relatives back home.
• A person from Tibet who promotes Tibetan culture in Japan said that when they went to the Chinese embassy in Tokyo to renew their passport, embassy officials told them they needed to return to Tibet to do so. -A person from Taiwan previously involved in Hong Kong’s pro-democracy activism in a third country said the Chinese embassy sent them multiple invitations to “retrieve important documents.”

[...]

A person from Taiwan previously involved in Hong Kong’s pro-democracy activism in a third country said the Chinese embassy sent them multiple invitations to “retrieve important documents.”

[...]

In recent years, the Japanese government has become increasingly vocal about the Chinese government’s human rights violations, including raising the issue with Chinese officials, and with resolutions in parliament to monitor the cases.

[...]

The Japanese government should recognize the threat posed by the Chinese government’s repression of Chinese nationals abroad, and help protect their basic rights by establishing a system for residents in Japan to report such incidents, Human Rights Watch said.

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Original version (paywalled)

The passport collection drive, carried out under what is known as “personal travel abroad management,” allows local government officials to control and monitor who can travel abroad, how often and to where.

It comes as Xi steps up state involvement in everyday life and clamps down on official corruption. China’s powerful state security apparatus has also intensified its campaign against foreign espionage.

Interviews with more than a dozen Chinese public sector workers and notices from education bureaus in half a dozen cities show restrictions on international travel have been greatly expanded from last year to include rank-and-file employees of schools, universities, local governments and state-owned groups.

[...]

“If we want to travel abroad, we have to apply to the city education bureau and I don’t think it will be approved,” said the teacher, asking that they and their city not be named.

[...]

Residents of restive regions such as Tibet lost their freedom to travel more than a decade ago. Starting in the mid-2010s, some areas applied “personal travel abroad management” rules to local teachers. Last year, after pandemic-era travel restrictions were lifted, more education bureaus began to introduce teacher travel restrictions and stepped them up this summer.

[...]

An entry-level salesperson at a bank in Nanjing said she was told to hand in her passport when she joined the state-owned group last year. After quitting in March, she had to wait six months for a “de-secrecy process” before she was able to retrieve it.

In central Hunan province, a mid-level official at a local government investment fund said he gained approval from nine different departments for a holiday abroad but still could not retrieve his passport.

[...]

The restrictions are hitting retirees as well. A 76-year-old who retired from a state-owned aircraft maker more than 10 years ago said his former employer took his passport back this year for “security reasons” and barred him from visiting family abroad.

[...]

China’s foreign ministry said it was not aware of the situation and referred questions to the relevant authorities.

China criminalizes human rights defenders with laws on Disturbing Social Order, while the top crime category across whole population is Endangering Public Security, an analysis by the Safeguard Defenders has found.

Safeguard Defenders analysed around 1,400 human rights-related court cases in China over the past 15 years. We used it show that the Chinese Communist Party continues to arrest and impose lengthy sentences on religious groups.

Decided criminal cases in courts of first instance as recorded on the Chinese Supreme Court’s National Court Judicial Statistics Bulletin (Gongbao) have grown from 766,746 in 2009 to 1,038,523 in 2022. That’s an increase of more than one third over 13 years. Total decided cases reached a peak in 2019 at almost 1.3 million, according to Safeguard Defenders.

Many of China’s laws are left intentionally vague, allowing the justice system great freedom to define its limits at will, the NGO adds.

Decided cases in courts of first instance in the category Endangering Public Security have risen four-fold from 86,814 in 2009 to 350,290 in 2022.

Obstructing the Administration of Social Order has also more than doubled from 133,639 to 298,803 over the same period.

[Decided cases are close to, but not exactly the same as, convictions. Decided cases are those that have gone to trial and reached a verdict (both guilty and non-guilty) in a court of first instance (that means it does not include appeals). Since convictions in China are near 100%, we can assume that this number is almost the same as first-instance convictions, Safeguard Defenders says.]

[Edit typo.]

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"China’s strategy involves decentralizing tasks horizontally across various security agencies, and vertically by incorporating civilian involvement," says Minxin Pei, a Chinese-American political scientist and author, currently serving as a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, and an expert on Chinese governance, US-East Asia relations, mass surveillance in China, and the democratization of developing nations.

"These civilians, while formally part of the security apparatus, take on key surveillance functions. This creates a unique system where surveillance is distributed and multifaceted, allowing the government to maintain control without the vulnerabilities that come with a single, centralized authority."

[...]

"Official Chinese media don’t play a significant role. Their primary function is to disseminate government-sanctioned messaging. I think that social media is the main target for surveillance because the government has a very sophisticated and effective way of monitoring what’s happening on social media. If a particular topic starts trending, they swiftly intervene to suppress it."

[...]

"This system [of China's control of people] was developed in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square. This taught the Chinese Communist Party a very important lesson: they needed to be aware of what was happening in society. Like other dictatorships, the Chinese Communist Party is very fearful of dissenting voices, especially activists, because they need to deter the population from engaging in protests, in anti-regime activities. Most of the time, these activities can be led by a small number of activists. Because they set an example, they show the rest of the population that they are not afraid. To make sure this does not happen, the government relies heavily on surveillance. If somebody dares to challenge the Party’s authority openly, that person will be discovered and punished.

[...]

"By introducing something like a cyber ID, the Party hopes to enhance self-censorship, as people will be afraid to express their dissatisfaction online. However, this approach might backfire. If individuals feel they can’t voice their frustrations online without repercussions, they may resort to more destructive means of expression. That’s why I believe this strategy may not be beneficial. Over time, this will also depend largely on the economy, as the Chinese security apparatus is primarily funded by local governments."

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"If the economy breaks down, it will be the first sign of trouble. You’ll likely see a degradation of the security system and a rise in public discontent. Another concern is the potential for corruption within the system itself. Those in charge of security wield significant power and have access to resources. Instead of using funds for informants or upgrading the system, they might enrich themselves."

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